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TORTURED LANGUAGE:  
LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENTS 
AND THE 212(H) WAIVER 
Julianne Lee* 
 
Recent amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act have greatly 
expanded the grounds for removal of lawful permanent residents (LPRs) 
and, at the same time, constricted judicial review of agency decisions to 
deport immigrants.  Language added to the 212(h) waiver of inadmissibility 
has increased the number of LPRs that are now ineligible for relief from 
removal by barring certain LPRs from applying for a waiver if, since the 
date of their admission, they have committed an aggravated felony or have 
failed to accrue seven years of continuous presence.  The controversy 
discussed in this Note stems from differing interpretations of this statutory 
provision. 
Nine courts of appeals have ruled that an aggravated felony or lack of 
continuous residence bars relief under section 212(h) only for those 
noncitizens who were admitted to the country as LPRs following inspection 
at a port of entry.  In removal proceedings outside of those circuits, the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) holds that relief is unavailable to all 
LPRs convicted of an aggravated felony or who fail to meet the residence 
requirements after acquiring LPR status, regardless of the manner in which 
they acquired that status.  The Eighth Circuit alone has followed that ruling 
(leaving only the First and Twelfth Circuits without an opinion on the 
issue). 
This Note describes the split over section 212(h) against the backdrop of 
current trends in immigration law around statutory interpretation and the 
agency deference doctrine.  It analyzes the current state of U.S. Supreme 
Court deference to the BIA to understand how this issue might play out in 
the Court and argues that the plain meaning of the statute supports the 
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holdings by the majority of courts of appeals.  It concludes by arguing for 
application of the immigration rule of lenity. 
 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1202 
I.  THE IMMIGRATION SCHEME AND SECTION 212(H):  A HIDEOUS 
CREATURE .................................................................................... 1205 
A.  Getting In:  LPR Status ........................................................... 1206 
B.  Kicked Out:  Grounds for Removal ........................................ 1206 
C.  Waivers and Discretionary Relief ........................................... 1208 
D.  Judicial Review of Removal Orders and Applications for 
Relief ..................................................................................... 1211 
II.  THE 212(H) CONFLICT ....................................................................... 1214 
A.  The Question’s Debut in the Fifth Circuit .............................. 1214 
B.  Courts Following the Fifth Circuit ......................................... 1216 
1.  The Definition Section of the INA ................................... 1216 
2.  The Immigration Rule of Lenity ...................................... 1219 
C.  The BIA and the Eighth Circuit .............................................. 1220 
1.  The Meaning of “Admission” in Other Provisions of the 
INA Makes the Use of “Admitted” in 212(h) 
Ambiguous ...................................................................... 1222 
2.  Absurdity Arguments ....................................................... 1224 
3.  Arguments for Deference to the BIA ............................... 1227 
D.  Supreme Court Deference to the BIA:  Where Is the Court 
Headed? ................................................................................ 1227 
1.  2009–2013:  Opinions Withholding Deference ............... 1227 
2.  2009–2013:  Opinions Granting Deference ..................... 1230 
3.  Theory About Deference in the Immigration Context ..... 1232 
III.  RESOLVING THE CONFLICT ............................................................... 1236 
A.  The Meaning of Section 212(h) Is Clear ................................. 1237 
B.  The BIA’s Interpretation Is Not Permissible:  A Call for 
Lenity .................................................................................... 1240 
C.  Where Is the Court Going? ..................................................... 1242 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 1244 
INTRODUCTION 
Nine-year-old Shaun Roberts traveled from his native Bahamas to the 
United States on a temporary visitor visa.1  He did not leave when his visa 
expired and fell out of status until becoming a lawful permanent resident 
(LPR) two years later.2  Over the next few decades, Roberts built a life in 
 
 1. Roberts v. Holder, 745 F.3d 928, 929 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 2. Id. at 929.  Most likely, Roberts was able to adjust status under an amnesty or 
legalization provision despite overstaying his visa. See RICHARD D. STEEL, STEEL ON 
IMMIGRATION LAW § 9:22, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2015). 
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the United States—a life that was interrupted in 2011 when he received a 
Notice to Appear in immigration court for a removal hearing.3  Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had learned that Roberts, now almost forty 
years old, had two criminal convictions in his home state of Minnesota.4  
Although his most recent conviction occurred more than ten years prior to 
his removal hearing, the immigration judge found that his crimes rendered 
Roberts removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act5 (INA). 
The immigration judge held that Roberts’s convictions rendered him 
statutorily ineligible for every form of relief he sought:  cancellation of 
removal, adjustment of status, and a waiver of inadmissibility.6  The Board 
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed.7  Roberts appealed to the Eighth 
Circuit, which affirmed the BIA’s holding that his third-degree assault 
conviction constituted an aggravated felony, making him removable and 
statutorily barring him from seeking cancellation of removal.8  The court 
had only to decide whether Roberts was eligible for an INA section 212(h) 
waiver of inadmissibility9—his last chance to remain in the United States.10  
Some foreign nationals who have been convicted of an aggravated felony 
are ineligible for a 212(h) waiver.11  Roberts’s fate—and those of countless 
LPRs—hinged on the interpretation of a single phrase:  “No waiver shall be 
granted under this subsection in the case of an alien who has previously 
been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence if . . . since the date of such admission the alien has 
been convicted of an aggravated felony.”12 
The BIA has interpreted that phrase as barring 212(h) relief for all LPRs 
convicted of an aggravated felony after acquiring LPR status, regardless of 
how they acquired that status.13  The Eighth Circuit chose to follow the 
BIA’s interpretation, finding Roberts ineligible for relief and ordering him 
removed to the Bahamas, a place in which he had not set foot for over thirty 
years.14 
In withholding 212(h) relief from Roberts, the Eighth Circuit diverged 
from every other circuit court that has grappled with the quoted statutory 
 
 3. Roberts, 745 F.3d at 929.  A Notice to Appear is a document that alleges facts and 
specifies the statutory removal grounds ICE is charging. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & 
CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 1, 515 (5th ed. 
2009). 
 4. Roberts, 745 F.3d at 929. 
 5. Id.  The immigration judge found that Roberts’s convictions constituted crimes 
involving moral turpitude and included one aggravated felony. See infra Part I.B. 
 6. Roberts, 745 F.3d at 929. 
 7. Id. at 929–30. 
 8. Id. at 931. 
 9. See Immigration & Nationality Act § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012). 
 10. Roberts, 745 F.3d at 931. 
 11. See infra Part I.C. 
 12. Roberts, 745 F.3d at 932 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(2)).  One court has referred to 
this provision as “tortured language.” Papazoglou v. Holder, 724 F.3d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 
2013). 
 13. See Matter of Rodriguez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 784, 789 (B.I.A. 2012); Matter of 
Koljenovic, 25 I. & N. Dec. 219, 224 (B.I.A. 2010). 
 14. Roberts, 745 F.3d at 929. 
1204 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
language.  To date, the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, 
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all held that the statute’s unambiguous 
language bars only those LPRs who entered the country already holding 
LPR status from eligibility for a 212(h) waiver.15  In those circuits, the 
aggravated felony bar does not apply to foreign nationals who entered the 
country with a different status or without any status at all and later attained 
LPR status post-admission.  Under this interpretation, Roberts would have 
been eligible for the 212(h) waiver, having entered the United States under 
temporary visitor status, and later adjusted to LPR status.  Put differently, 
had he lived in a different state, his appeal’s outcome might have been 
different. 
This Note considers the lopsided circuit split over whether all LPRs are 
barred from seeking a 212(h) waiver of inadmissibility regardless of 
whether they, like Roberts, adjusted to LPR status after their initial entry or 
whether they entered the country holding that status.  The split raises 
questions of traditional statutory interpretation and judicial deference to the 
immigration agency.  There are two strong reasons the U.S. Supreme Court 
should step in to settle the meaning of section 212(h).  First, in the removal 
context, issues of statutory interpretation have profound and direct 
consequences on individual lives.16  Second, the Court has said that federal 
laws should be uniformly enforced where possible.17  Given the split—with 
a lone circuit siding with the agency and nine circuits against it—the 
question is ripe for a Supreme Court ruling. 
Part I describes the 212(h) waiver within the context of removal and 
relief.  It provides background information on immigration’s statutory 
scheme, as well as describes the dwindling avenues for relief and narrowing 
of judicial review of BIA decisions.  Part II presents the circuit split and the 
BIA decision relating to LPRs’ eligibility for 212(h) waivers.  It also 
describes different theories on where the Court is headed in terms of its 
deference (or lack thereof) to the BIA based on immigration decisions from 
the 2009 to 2013 Terms.  Part III argues that the majority of the courts of 
 
 15. See Medina-Rosales v. Holder, 778 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2015); Husic v. Holder, 776 
F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2015); Stanovsek v. Holder, 768 F.3d 515 (6th Cir. 2014); Negrete-Ramirez 
v. Holder, 741 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2014); Papazoglou v. Holder, 725 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 
2013); Leiba v. Holder, 699 F.3d 346 (4th Cir. 2012); Bracamontes v. Holder, 675 F.3d 380 
(4th Cir. 2012); Hanif v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 479 (3d Cir. 2012); Lanier v. Att’y Gen., 631 
F.3d 1363 (11th Cir. 2011); Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 16. See, e.g., Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (citing Delgadillo v. 
Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388 (1947)) (noting that deportation can equate to “banishment or 
exile” and that stakes in removal hearings are high); Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 
(1922) (noting that removal leads to “loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life 
worth living”); Aris v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 595, 600 (2d Cir. 2008) (“In immigration matters, 
so much is at stake—the right to remain in this country, to reunite a family, or to work.”); 
see also Jennifer L. Colyer et al., The Representational and Counseling Needs of the 
Immigrant Poor, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 461, 463–64 (2009) (noting the particular 
vulnerability of immigrants subject to removal proceedings). 
 17. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 2000 (2011) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing Congress’s goal of uniform enforcement of 
immigration laws). 
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appeals are correct in their interpretation of section 212(h).  That part 
resolves the larger statutory interpretation and policy issues implicated by 
an analysis of section 212(h).  It argues that, given the complexity of the 
immigration scheme, strict interpretations of the INA should trump agency 
deference arguments.  This Note concludes by arguing that the Supreme 
Court should rule against the BIA and the Eighth Circuit if it considers the 
section 212(h) issue. 
I.  THE IMMIGRATION SCHEME AND SECTION 212(H):  
A HIDEOUS CREATURE 
Part I provides background information on the structure of the INA to 
show how section 212(h) fits within the larger immigration context.  This 
part describes important modern immigration trends, including diminishing 
opportunities for relief from deportation and narrowing of judicial review, 
against the historical backdrop of judicial deference in the immigration 
arena. 
The U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress “[t]o establish an uniform 
Rule of Naturalization.”18  The Court has long held that Congress has broad 
power to decide whom to admit and exclude from the United States—that 
power being an integral and inherent part of national sovereignty.19  Under 
this longstanding plenary power doctrine, Congress exercises nearly 
unreviewable power to regulate immigration.20 
While the first attempt to restrict immigration dates back to the Alien Act 
of 1798, Congress passed the bulk of immigration legislation in the 
twentieth century.21  In 1952, Congress overhauled the existing immigration 
scheme and enacted the INA, which, together with decades of amendments, 
provides the current statutory framework for modern immigration law.22  
The INA sets forth intricate rules for who may enter the country and what 
they must do to stay; its notoriously complex nature has led one 
commentator to call it a “hideous creature.”23 
 
 18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 19. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713–14, 762 (1893) (holding that 
the right of a nation to exclude or expel foreigners is absolute and unqualified); Chae Chan 
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (holding that Congress has the power to set 
admission and exclusion rules). 
 20. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts:  
Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1616–17 (2000). See generally 
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:  Phantom 
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990). 
 21. STEEL, supra note 2, § 1:1. 
 22. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 
(1952) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22 U.S.C.). 
 23. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 3, at 1.  Some have called immigration law 
“equal in complexity to tax law.” Anna Marie Gallagher, Ethics, Professionalism, and 
Immigration Law, 11-12 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 1 (2011), Westlaw. 
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A.  Getting In:  LPR Status 
Anyone who has waited in line at New York’s John F. Kennedy Airport 
or another major international hub has witnessed how U.S. immigration law 
divides people into categories.  The first major division is between citizens 
and noncitizens.24  Noncitizens are further categorized as immigrants, 
nonimmigrants, or undocumented persons.25  Nonimmigrants include 
students, tourists, business visitors, workers, and anyone coming to the 
United States for temporary purposes.26  Immigrants, on the other hand, 
intend to remain in the United States on a permanent basis,27 usually as 
LPRs—popularly known as “green-card holders.”28  In general, after at 
least five years as an LPR, a person can apply for naturalization and become 
a citizen.29 
To qualify for LPR status, a noncitizen must show eligibility based on 
family- or employment-based ties to the United States, or a valid refugee or 
asylee claim.30  Furthermore, she must prove that she is not “inadmissible” 
for any reason.31  There are two different processes for obtaining LPR 
status.  A person residing abroad can obtain an immigrant visa from a 
consular officer and present it to an inspector upon entering the United 
States.32  Once the inspector authorizes the visa, the person has been 
“admitted” as an LPR.33  Alternatively, a person already physically present 
in the United States can obtain LPR status without leaving the country 
through “adjustment of status”34 (AOS). 
B.  Kicked Out:  Grounds for Removal 
Immigration categories are important not only for practical reasons, but 
also because they influence a person’s rights and responsibilities.35  For 
example, a person on a student visa cannot generally accept employment in 
the United States, while an LPR can work and must file income tax 
returns.36  Only a citizen can vote in elections and pass citizenship on to her 
 
 24. The INA uses the term “alien” to describe noncitizens.  Many immigration scholars 
choose to avoid that dehumanizing term in favor of “noncitizen” except for when directly 
quoting statutes or other sources. See, e.g., LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 3, at 1.  
This Note follows that practice. 
 25. STEEL, supra note 2, § 2:23. 
 26. INA § 101(a)(15)(A)–(V), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(A)–(V) (2012). 
 27. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(A). 
 28. Id. § 1101 (a)(20). 
 29. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 3, at 6. 
 30. STEEL, supra note 2, § 2:24.  Visas are subject to quota numbers. Id. § 2:25. 
 31. Id. § 2:26. 
 32. Id. § 7:1 (describing “consular processing”). 
 33. “Admission” and “admitted” mean “the lawful entry of the alien into the United 
States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(13)(A).  The meaning of the word “admitted” in various contexts is contentious. 
See Elwin Griffith, The Meaning of Admission and the Effect of Waivers Under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 55 HOW. L.J. 1, 6 (2011). 
 34. See STEEL, supra note 2, § 7:1. 
 35. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 3, at 1373–77. 
 36. See id. at 250. 
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children,37 and citizens have the strongest claim to remaining in the United 
States permanently.38  Although LPRs can live and work in the United 
States “permanently,” changes in immigration law have made the threat and 
possibility of removal ever more present. 
The INA lists several reasons a noncitizen may be removed, which 
include public health concerns, criminal convictions, drug violations, and 
national security.39  Noncitizens who have not been formally admitted to 
the United States (such as those seeking admission from abroad or those 
present without proper documentation) are subject to “inadmissibility” or 
“exclusion” grounds under section 212(a).40  Noncitizens already admitted 
to the United States are subject to deportability grounds set forth in section 
237(a).41 
Since its inception, the INA has evoked criticism for its harshness.42  
Today’s INA is significantly tougher than the body of laws passed in 1952.  
The Immigration Act of 1990 substantially restructured the grounds for 
removal and made sweeping changes to deportation procedures and 
remedies, making them far stricter, especially when related to drug or 
criminal charges.43  Congress passed several restrictive revisions in the 
decade that followed, which coincided with the heavy anti-immigrant 
sentiment of the period.44  Most notably, the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) greatly expanded the 
grounds for removal.45  In particular, IIRIRA vastly expanded which crimes 
fall under the definition of “aggravated felony.”46  Prior to 1996, only 
murder and trafficking in drugs or firearms were considered aggravated 
 
 37. See id. at 1374. 
 38. It is difficult to strip someone of citizenship. See generally Charles E. Hooker, The 
Past As Prologue:  Schneiderman v. United States and Contemporary Questions of 
Citizenship and Denationalization, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 305 (2005). 
 39. See INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2012); INA § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a). 
 40. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a); see CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND 
PROCEDURE § 71.01 (Matthew Bender ed., 2014), LexisNexis. 
 41. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a).  Prior to 1996, noncitizens were subject to legal distinctions 
depending on whether they were seeking entry into the United States or had already made it 
inside. See Matthew F. Soares, Note, Agencies and Aliens:  A Modified Approach to Chevron 
Deference in Immigration Cases, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 925, 929 (2014).  “Exclusion” 
referred to refusal to admit someone at the border, whereas “deportation” referred to removal 
of a person already inside. Id.  The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 consolidated both into “removal” proceedings. Id.  Nonetheless, 
the original distinction remains functionally important because it determines which grounds 
of removal apply. See id.; see also Matthew J. Geyer, Note, Involuntary Return and the 
“Found in” Clause of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a):  An Immigration Conundrum, 83 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2091, 2097 (2015). 
 42. The INA was enacted over President Truman’s veto; Truman questioned the severity 
of exclusion, deportation, and denaturalization grounds. CHARLES GORDON ET AL., supra note 
40, § 2.03. 
 43. STEEL, supra note 2, § 1:3. 
 44. See id.; see also Maritza I. Reyes, Constitutionalizing Immigration Law:  The Vital 
Role of Judicial Discretion in the Removal of Lawful Permanent Residents, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 
637, 662 (2012). 
 45. Soares, supra note 41, at 929. 
 46. STEEL, supra note 2, § 13:16. 
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felonies.47  Now, the list of aggravated felonies includes murder; rape; 
sexual abuse of a minor; illicit trafficking in a controlled substance, 
firearms, or explosives; crimes of violence; theft offenses; and more.48  Any 
noncitizen that is convicted of such a felony at any time after her admission 
is removable.49 
C.  Waivers and Discretionary Relief 
As a result of the expansion of the grounds for removal, thousands of 
noncitizens now find themselves in removal proceedings each year, 
searching for forms of relief.50  The Immigration Act of 1924 required the 
deportation of any noncitizen present in the United States in violation of 
immigration laws, without exception.51  Between 1940 and 1990, Congress 
added several discretionary waivers of removal, only to pass legislation in 
the 1990s and 2000s that significantly curtailed that relief.52  While the 
grounds for removal have expanded, the possibilities for discretionary relief 
continue to shrink.53 
Relief provisions entail a balancing of misconduct against other factors, 
such as the removable noncitizen’s long-term residence in the United 
States, chance of persecution in a foreign country, or relationships with U.S. 
citizen or LPR family members.54  A noncitizen must affirmatively apply 
for relief in removal proceedings.55  Forms of relief include asylum, 
Convention Against Torture waivers,56 and withholding of removal.57  
Cancellation of removal—one of the most common forms of relief sought 
in removal proceedings58—is available to noncitizens who have been in the 
United States for a long time, have substantial ties to the country, and have 
 
 47. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 
4469–70. 
 48. INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012).  The Supreme Court has called 
this section a “maze of statutory cross-references” because it defines “aggravated felony” by 
reference to several other federal statutes. See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 
567 (2010). 
 49. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(iii). 
 50. In fiscal year 2014, ICE completed a total of 315,943 removals. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 7 (2014), https:// 
www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/2014-ice-immigration-removals.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/4QQG-WNGK]. 
 51. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, § 14, 43 Stat. 153, 162. 
 52. See Soares, supra note 41, at 927–29. 
 53. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010) (“The ‘drastic measure’ of 
deportation or removal is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted 
of crimes.” (quoting Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948))). 
 54. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 3, at 593. 
 55. Id. 
 56. CHARLES GORDON ET AL., supra note 40, § 33.10. 
 57. INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2012). 
 58. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2013 
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK N1 (2014), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy13syb.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/KZZ5-3VSR]. 
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not committed certain crimes.59  A noncitizen who has been convicted of an 
aggravated felony at any time cannot receive cancellation of removal.60 
Where a single criminal act makes a noncitizen both inadmissible and 
ineligible for cancellation of removal, she may still qualify for a waiver on 
the ground of inadmissibility.61  A common type of inadmissibility 
waiver—a “hardship waiver”—applies when a noncitizen shows that her 
citizen or LPR relatives would face extreme hardship if she were denied a 
waiver.62  Hardship waivers are available for some criminal grounds,63 
immigration fraud or misrepresentation,64 and unlawful presence bars.65  
When determining whether a person’s removal will cause extreme hardship 
to her qualifying relative, adjudicators weigh a list of factors compiled 
through case law.66 
There are several other waivers for specific grounds of inadmissibility.67  
An applicant for any kind of waiver must first show that she is statutorily 
eligible to apply for the waiver and then that she merits the favorable 
exercise of discretion.68  The adjudicator weighs the negative factors in the 
case—including the nature of the immigration violation, the applicant’s 
criminal record, and any evidence of bad character—against the positive 
equities—such as family ties, long-term residence, evidence of hardship, 
history of employment, and good character.69  While this discretionary 
process may forgive certain criminal grounds, many of the waivers are 
statutorily unavailable to noncitizens who have been convicted of 
aggravated felonies.  Thus, one of the primary barriers to relief stems from 
the INA’s expanded definition of “aggravated felony.”70 
Nestled within this constellation of relief provisions lies the 212(h) 
waiver of inadmissibility.  Section 212(h) waivers are available to 
noncitizens (1) whose offending activities (mostly prostitution related) 
 
 59. See INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.  Requirements differ for LPRs and non-LPRs. 
Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), with 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). 
 60. See id. §§ 1229b(a)(3), 1229b(b). 
 61. See CHARLES GORDON ET AL., supra note 40, § 63.12. 
 62. Only certain types of relationships qualify. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (defining a 
qualifying relative as a U.S.-citizen or LPR spouse, parent, son, or daughter of the applicant).  
The applicant cannot prove eligibility based on her own hardship, with the exception of self-
petitioners covered by the Violence Against Women Act. CHARLES GORDON ET AL., supra 
note 40, § 63.12. 
 63. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). 
 64. Id. § 1182(i). 
 65. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v). 
 66. CHARLES GORDON ET AL., supra note 40, § 63.12.  Factors include the extent of the 
qualifying relative’s family ties in the United States that might be broken if she relocated 
with the waiver applicant, the qualifying relative’s ties to her U.S. community, the qualifying 
relative’s lack of ties to the foreign country or inability to speak the language, the conditions 
in the foreign country to which the relative might relocate with the waiver applicant, and 
significant health or psychological factors. Id. 
 67. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(k) (documentary problems); id. § 1182(c) (LPRs guilty of 
certain offenses pre-IIRIRA); id. § 1182(d)(3)(B)(i) (terrorism). 
 68. CHARLES GORDON ET AL., supra note 40, § 63.12. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Soares, supra note 41, at 929. 
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occurred more than fifteen years earlier and who show that they are 
rehabilitated; (2) who have qualifying relatives who would suffer extreme 
hardship upon denial of the waiver; or (3) who were victims of domestic 
violence.71 
The inadmissible noncitizen must show that she falls under one of the 
three enumerated categories and that she is not otherwise barred from 
applying for the waiver.72  Prior to IIRIRA, the only noncitizens statutorily 
barred from receiving 212(h) waivers were those who had “been convicted 
of (or who ha[d] admitted committing acts that constitute) murder or 
criminal acts involving torture.”73  With IIRIRA however, Congress 
expanded the category of noncitizens ineligible for the waiver as follows: 
No waiver shall be granted under this subsection in the case of an alien 
who has previously been admitted to the United States as an alien 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence if either since the date of such 
admission the alien has been convicted of an aggravated felony or the 
alien has not lawfully resided continuously in the United States for a 
period of not less than 7 years immediately preceding the date of initiation 
of proceedings to remove the alien from the United States.  No court shall 
have jurisdiction to review a decision of the Attorney General to grant or 
deny a waiver under this subsection.74 
The controversy discussed in this Note stems from differing 
interpretations of the italicized phrase above.  The Second, Third, Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits (“the majority 
courts”) have ruled that an aggravated felony or lack of continuous 
residence bars relief under section 212(h) only for those noncitizens who 
are admitted to the country as LPRs following inspection at a port of 
entry.75  In removal proceedings outside of those circuits, the BIA holds 
that relief is unavailable to all LPRs who were convicted of an aggravated 
felony or who failed to meet the residence requirements after acquiring LPR 
status, regardless of the manner in which they gained that status.76  The 
Eighth Circuit alone has sided with the BIA.77 
 
 71. Brief of the Am. Immigration Council and the Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n As 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 3–4, Roberts v. Holder, 745 
F.3d 928 (2014) (No. 12-3359), http://legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/Roberts%20 
Amicus%20Brief.pdf [http://perma.cc/5TGK-U7ZN].  All of the noncitizens in cases that 
make up the circuit split discussed in Part II fall under category (2). See infra Part II. 
 72. The Attorney General may then exercise discretion to waive the noncitizen’s 
inadmissibility.  A person in removal proceedings may seek a 212(h) waiver concurrent to an 
AOS or re-AOS, not on a “standalone” basis. Matter of Rivas, 26 I. & N. Dec. 130, 133 
(B.I.A. 2013). 
 73. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601(d)(4), 104 Stat. 4978, 5077. 
 74. INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 75. See infra Part II.A, II.B. 
 76. See infra Part II.C. 
 77. See infra Part II.C. 
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D.  Judicial Review of Removal Orders 
and Applications for Relief 
In addition to the expansion of the grounds for removal and bars to relief, 
two other factors make it difficult to challenge a removal order.  First, 
judges have historically been deferential to immigration agencies.  Second, 
Congress has narrowed the scope of judicial review in the immigration 
context. 
Congress has delegated immigration authority to several administrative 
agencies.78  In particular, the Executive Office of Immigration Review 
(EOIR), under the Department of Justice (DOJ), administers the 
immigration court system.79  EOIR consists of a national network of 
immigration judges (IJs) who preside over removal proceedings.80  The 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) summons a person to appear at a 
removal hearing by issuing a Notice to Appear (NTA); an IJ then 
determines whether the person fits within one or more of the alleged 
grounds for removal and whether she is eligible for, and deserving of, the 
relief for which she has applied.81  The IJ may find that (1) the person is not 
removable, (2) she is removable and ineligible for discretionary relief 
(resulting in a removal order), or (3) she is removable but qualifies for 
discretionary relief (resulting in the termination of proceedings).82  The 
DHS or the noncitizen may appeal the IJ’s decision to the BIA.83 
The BIA is the “highest administrative body for interpreting and applying 
immigration laws.”84  The agency generally does not conduct courtroom 
hearings, but instead decides appeals by reviewing the record.85  It defers to 
the IJ’s findings of fact unless there is clear error.86  Since 2000, the BIA’s 
structure and procedures have changed significantly.87  Responding to an 
enormous backlog of cases, the BIA implemented several streamlining 
regulations, which included replacing three-judge panels with single judges 
 
 78. The Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), State, Labor, Justice, and Health and 
Human Services share oversight of immigration procedures and policies. LEGOMSKY & 
RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 3, at 5.  The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA) reorganized the 
agency apparatus, replacing the Immigration and Naturalization Service with two separate 
entities within DHS:  Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE). Id. at 2–3.  CBP is responsible for enforcement at borders and ports of 
entry; ICE manages interior enforcement, including investigations, detention, and 
intelligence gathering. Id. at 3.  Additionally, the HSA created the U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Service to handle immigration benefit applications. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 515. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Feb 6. 2015), http://www.justice. 
gov/eoir/biainfo.htm [http://perma.cc/F4Y8-GXZ4]. 
 85. Id. (calling the process a “paper review”); see also LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra 
note 3, at 4. 
 86. STEEL, supra note 2, § 2:7. 
 87. See Shruti Rana, Chevron Without the Courts?:  The Supreme Court’s Recent 
Chevron Jurisprudence Through an Immigration Lens, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313, 327 
(2012). 
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and allowing the BIA to issue one-line summary affirmances of IJs’ 
decisions without endorsing or suggesting alternatives to IJs’ rationales.88 
Changes in the BIA’s administrative procedures have resulted in a flood 
of immigration appeals to the federal courts.89  A noncitizen may petition 
for review of a BIA decision in the applicable U.S. court of appeals.90  The 
level of deference that federal courts should afford BIA decisions has been 
a longstanding source of debate91 and informs the current conflict in the 
courts of appeals over whether to agree with the BIA’s construction of 
section 212(h). 
The judicially created plenary power doctrine holds that Congress has 
broad power to regulate immigration; under this view, the executive branch, 
by extension, deserves substantial deference in setting and enforcing 
immigration policy.92  This broad deference comes from the notion that 
immigration is unique.93  As a result, the Supreme Court has not applied 
due process or equal protection safeguards as stringently in the immigration 
context as in other areas.94  Some scholars have termed this deviation from 
legal norms “immigration exceptionalism.”95  However, some scholars have 
suggested that the plenary power doctrine’s grip on immigration 
 
 88. Id. at 318; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e) (2011). 
 89. Rana, supra note 87, at 327. 
 90. The government may not make appeals higher than the BIA.  BIA decisions are 
ultimately reviewable by the Supreme Court. See STEEL, supra note 2, § 14:38. 
 91. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Stein, Delineating Discretion:  How Judulang Limits Executive 
Immigration Policy-Making Authority and Opens Channels for Future Challenges, 27 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 35, 55 (2012) (noting that debate over plenary power and the balance of power 
between the executive and legislative branches is “still very much alive in both classrooms 
and courtrooms”). 
 92. Id. at 40–41, 55–56; Soares, supra note 41, at 926; see also Nishimura Ekiu v. 
United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (holding that Congress’s power to regulate 
immigration extends to the power to enforce immigration laws, which it may do by 
delegating to agency officials the power to set procedures). 
 93. The Court has offered several rationales for the plenary power doctrine; one such 
rationale is that immigration policy entails political questions because it implicates foreign 
affairs. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary 
Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 260–78. 
 94. See, e.g., Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976) (“In the exercise of its broad 
power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be 
unacceptable if applied to citizens.”); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 
537, 544 (1950) (“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far 
as an alien denied entry is concerned.”); see also Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of 
Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1984). 
 95. See e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, 2009–13:  A New 
Era of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 57, 59 (2015).  But Gabriel 
Chin argues the plenary power doctrine is nothing more than dicta; historic immigration 
decisions holding discriminatory and racist congressional action immune from judicial 
review were simply products of their time: 
At the time they were decided, many of the terrible immigration cases could have 
come out the same way even if they involved the rights of citizens under domestic 
constitutional law. . . .  There is no need for a special plenary power doctrine or 
other constitutional rule to explain these cases . . . . 
Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine?:  A Tentative Apology and Prediction 
for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
257, 258 (2000). 
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jurisprudence—at least in the Supreme Court—may be loosening.96  Some 
call the doctrine as good as dead,97 while others believe unscrupulous 
judicial deference to the BIA continues.98 
The Court’s framework for reviewing agency statutory interpretation 
from Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.99 has 
often worked to reinforce and bolster the plenary power doctrine in the 
immigration context, restraining a reviewing court’s analysis of BIA 
decisions centering on interpretations of the INA.100  However, a Chevron 
analysis does not preclude a judge from overturning a BIA construction—
especially if the judge finds that the statute clearly supports an 
interpretation contrary to the agency’s.101 
In addition to doctrinal restrictions on judicial review, Congress has 
enacted INA provisions that restrict judges’ role in reviewing BIA 
decisions.  IIRIRA drastically restructured the relationship between the 
courts and the BIA.102  For example, although noncitizens may appeal BIA 
decisions to the courts of appeals, federal judges generally do not have 
jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary decisions.103  Instead, the 
federal courts only review questions of law.104  This practice seriously 
limits the amount of judicial review available to persons challenging orders 
of removal or denials of discretionary relief.105 
 
 96. See generally Motomura, supra note 20. 
 97. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 95, at 61; Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of 
Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339 (2002). 
 98. See Rana, supra note 87, at 343; Soares, supra note 41. 
 99. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  Chevron holds that, at Step One, a court should employ 
traditional tools of statutory construction to determine Congress’s intent and to determine 
whether the statute speaks directly to the issue at hand. Id. at 843 n.9.  If congressional intent 
is clear, the court must follow it. Id. at 842–43.  If the statute is ambiguous, the reviewing 
court moves to Step Two, determining whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute is 
reasonable; if so, the court must defer to the agency. Id. 
 100. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (noting that the BIA 
deserves special deference because immigration deals with sensitive political functions 
implicating questions of foreign relations). 
 101. For one of the first cases applying Chevron to the BIA’s interpretation of the INA 
and overturning the agency’s construction of an asylum statute because contrary 
congressional intent was clear, see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
 102. See Austen Ishii, There and Back, Now and Then:  IIRIRA’s Retroactivity and the 
Normalization of Judicial Review in Immigration Law, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 949, 955–56 
(2014).  IIRIRA, combined with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
and the REAL ID Act, imposed many unprecedented restrictions on review by the courts of 
appeals over individual deportation and removal orders. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 40, 
§ 104.13[2] (listing many of the new restrictions). 
 103. Decisions related to waivers, cancellation of removal, voluntary departure, and AOS 
are discretionary. STEEL, supra note 2, § 14:38; see, e.g., INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) 
(2012) (stating that “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision of the Attorney 
General to grant or deny a waiver under this subsection”). 
 104. See, e.g., Hanif v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 2012); Bracamontes v. 
Holder, 675 F.3d 380, 384 (4th Cir. 2012); Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 538 (5th Cir. 
2008). 
 105. STEEL, supra note 2, § 14:38. 
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It is against this backdrop of broadening grounds for removal, narrowing 
relief, and restricted judicial review that the conflict over section 212(h) has 
materialized. 
II.  THE 212(H) CONFLICT 
The BIA follows a court of appeals’s decision overruling its own 
determination within that circuit but is free to follow its own interpretation 
elsewhere, which can lead to inconsistent applications of immigration law 
in different parts of the country.106  Nine courts of appeals have declined to 
defer to the BIA on its interpretation of section 212(h), while one court has 
sided with the agency—creating a framework in which the question of 
whether noncitizens can remain in the United States may turn on where 
they live.107  Part II details the legal conflict over whether noncitizens that 
adjusted to LPR status within the United States are eligible to apply for 
212(h) waivers for committing certain crimes or not meeting continuous 
residence requirements.  Part II.A analyzes the Fifth Circuit’s decision on 
the issue, which eight other circuits have followed.  Part II.B describes the 
arguments that the majority of the courts of appeals have presented for why 
LPRs who have adjusted status post-admission should be eligible for 212(h) 
waivers.  Part II.C presents the contrary arguments raised by the BIA, the 
Eighth Circuit, and the dissenting opinions in the courts of appeals.  Lastly, 
Part II.D presents theories on the current state of Supreme Court deference 
to the BIA based on the 2009 to 2013 Terms. 
A.  The Question’s Debut in the Fifth Circuit 
The first federal appellate court to address the issue of LPRs’ eligibility 
to apply for 212(h) waivers was the Fifth Circuit in Martinez v. Mukasey.108  
Jose Martinez lawfully entered the United States from Argentina on a 
nonimmigrant visitor visa in 1980 and adjusted his status in 1990.109  
Martinez later married a U.S. citizen and fathered two U.S.-citizen 
children.110  In 2001, he pled guilty to bank fraud and served prison time.  
Shortly after his release, ICE officials took Martinez into custody and 
initiated removal proceedings, alleging that he had committed an 
aggravated felony.111  Martinez argued that his crime did not constitute an 
aggravated felony, but he also applied for a 212(h) waiver of inadmissibility 
 
 106. Soares, supra note 41, at 937–38. 
 107. The BIA currently follows its own more narrow interpretation of section 212(h)—
that the aggravated felony and continuous presence bar applies to all LPRs regardless of how 
they gained that status—in the First, Eighth, and Twelfth Circuits. See infra note 176 and 
accompanying text. 
 108. 519 F.3d 532 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 109. Id. at 536. 
 110. Id. 
 111. ICE relied on INA section 101 (a)(43)(M)(i) (allowing removal for “fraud or deceit 
in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000”), which made Martinez 
removable under INA section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii). Martinez, 519 F.3d at 536. 
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on the basis of extreme hardship to his U.S.-citizen wife and children.112  
The IJ held (and the BIA affirmed) that Martinez was removable and 
statutorily ineligible to seek relief under section 212(h) as an LPR with an 
aggravated felony conviction.113  On appeal, the Fifth Circuit overruled the 
BIA’s interpretation of the 212(h) felony bar, holding that Martinez was 
eligible for a 212(h) waiver despite agreeing that his conviction was an 
aggravated felony.114 
The court noted that, while it could not review a discretionary decision to 
deny or grant a 212(h) waiver, it had jurisdiction to review questions of law 
involving the BIA’s construction of section 212(h).115  The legal question at 
issue was whether the statute’s language—“previously been admitted to the 
United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence 
[and] . . . since the date of such admission the alien has been convicted of 
an aggravated felony”—barred LPRs who had adjusted status inside the 
country from qualifying for a 212(h) waiver.116  Martinez contended that, 
even if his conviction was an aggravated felony, he was eligible for a 
212(h) waiver because he was never admitted as an LPR; rather, he adjusted 
status ten years after his initial admission as a nonimmigrant.117  The BIA 
argued that any LPR convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after 
acquiring that status was barred from using section 212(h).118 
The court cited Chevron as guiding its analysis of whether it should defer 
to the agency’s interpretation, noting that, in general, the court was 
constrained by the need to afford substantial deference to the BIA’s 
interpretation of the INA.119  Applying the statutory definitions of 
“admission” and “admitted” to the text of section 212(h), the court found 
that “admitted” as used in the aggravated felony bar provision referred to a 
noncitizen’s lawful entry into the country while holding LPR status.120  It 
concluded that the statute’s plain language unambiguously demonstrated 
that Congress did not intend to bar those LPRs who adjusted status post-
 
 112. Martinez, 519 F.3d at 537. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 541–46. 
 115. Id. at 541. 
 116. Id. at 542. 
 117. Id. 
 118. The BIA relied on Matter of Rosas, where it held that a noncitizen who, unlike 
Martinez, entered without inspection and later adjusted to LPR status could be subject to 
removal proceedings under INA section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) based on having an aggravated 
felony conviction. Matter of Rosas, 22 I. & N. Dec. 616 (B.I.A. 1999) (en banc).  It 
considered LPRs who obtained status through AOS to have an “admission” for that 
particular provision but declined to resolve the meaning of “admission” in other contexts. Id.  
In Martinez’s case, the BIA extended that reasoning to section 212(h). Martinez, 519 F.3d at 
542.  The Fifth Circuit noted that the language of INA section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) differs from 
section 212(h). Id.  It says that “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any 
time after admission is deportable.” Id. 
 119. Martinez, 519 F.3d at 542.  It emphasized that “[r]ecitation of this substantial-
deference standard, without more, is insufficient to require our deference in this instance.” 
Id. 
 120. Id. at 544; see also infra Part II.B.1. 
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entry from seeking a waiver of inadmissibility.121  Furthermore, reading the 
statute to allow those who adjusted to LPR status subsequent to entry to 
apply for 212(h) waivers comported with the immigration rule of lenity.122 
B.  Courts Following the Fifth Circuit 
Since Martinez, nine other courts of appeals have considered the question 
of whether the aggravated felony and continuous presence bars to 212(h) 
eligibility apply to LPRs who adjusted status post-entry.123  Besides the 
Eighth Circuit, which diverged from the majority in March 2014, each court 
has adopted the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning, finding that the provision at issue 
in section 212(h) unambiguously bars only the applications of those LPRs 
who acquired status through consular processing.124  Although Martinez 
considered the question in light of a petitioner who had entered the country 
lawfully in a different status than LPR, courts have applied the Fifth 
Circuit’s interpretation to both LPRs who were inspected and admitted by 
an immigration officer in some other status125 as well as those who entered 
the United States illegally and later adjusted status.126  All of the majority 
courts applied Chevron and found the language of section 212(h) to be 
unambiguous.127  This section presents their arguments. 
1.  The Definition Section of the INA 
In considering whether adjustment to LPR status while already living in 
the United States qualifies as having previously been “admitted” to the 
 
 121. Martinez, 519 F.3d at 546.  The court cited Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 
503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992), for the principle that a court must begin with the plain 
language of the text to get to congressional intent:  “[C]ourts must presume that a legislature 
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says.” Id. at 543. 
 122. Id. at 544; see also infra Part II.B.2. 
 123. In most cases, the BIA deemed respondents ineligible for 212(h) waivers on the 
basis of aggravated felonies, but one had been found ineligible for failure to meet the seven-
year continuous presence requirement. See Hanif v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 479, 481 (3d Cir. 
2012). 
 124. Medina-Rosales v. Holder, 778 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2015); Husic v. Holder, 776 
F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2015); Stanovsek v. Holder, 768 F.3d 515 (6th Cir. 2014); Negrete-Ramirez 
v. Holder, 741 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2014); Papazoglou v. Holder, 725 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 
2013); Leiba v. Holder, 699 F.3d 346 (4th Cir. 2012); Hanif, 694 F.3d 479; Bracamontes v. 
Holder, 675 F.3d 380 (4th Cir. 2012); Lanier v. Att’y Gen., 631 F.3d 1363 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 125. See, e.g., Husic, 776 F.3d at 60 (petitioner entered on B-2 visa, later received 
asylum, and adjusted to LPR); Stanovsek, 768 F.3d at 516 (petitioner entered on 
nonimmigrant visa and adjusted by marriage); Negrete-Ramirez, 741 F.3d at 1049 (petitioner 
entered on B-2 visa and adjusted to LPR shortly after); Papazoglou, 725 F.3d at 791 
(petitioner entered on B-2 visa and adjusted through marriage). 
 126. Leiba, 699 F.3d at 347 (petitioner crossed border illegally but adjusted status 
pursuant to an employment-based petition); Hanif, 694 F.3d at 481 (petitioner entered on 
fraudulent visa and obtained marriage-based adjustment); Bracamontes, 675 F.3d at 382 
(petitioner entered without inspection and adjusted fourteen years later); Lanier, 631 F.3d at 
1365 (petitioner entered without inspection and adjusted to LPR four years later). 
 127. See, e.g., Husic, 776 F.3d at 66 (“[T]he statutory text is unambiguous.”); Stanovsek, 
768 F.3d at 516 (noting “inescapably clear language”); Hanif, 694 F.3d at 481 (stating that 
the language was “clear and unambiguous on its face”). 
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country “for permanent residence” under section 212(h), the Eleventh 
Circuit emphasized that, in writing the eligibility bar, Congress used two 
terms of art that it “expressly defined” in section 101 of the INA.128  
Interpreting the statute required the court to apply the given definitions and 
“to assess the effect of each term on the meaning of [section 212(h)] as a 
whole.”129  The rest of the majority courts similarly felt constrained to 
apply the defined meanings of “admitted” and “lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence.”130 
Section 101(a)(13)(A) of the INA defines “admitted” and “admission” as 
“the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and 
authorization by an immigration officer.”131  The courts read the word 
“admitted” to contemplate a “physical crossing of the border following the 
sanction and approval of United States authorities”132 and to exclude post-
entry AOS.133  The Fifth Circuit pointed to legislative history to support 
this reading.134  The court noted that after IIRIRA’s passage, members of 
Congress attempted, through the Immigration Technical Corrections Act of 
1997, to amend section 101(a)(13)(A)’s definition of “admission” and 
“admitted” to explicitly include AOS.135  Thus, at least some members of 
Congress did not consider the enacted definition of “admitted” to include 
post-entry AOS; the fact that the proposed amendment was rejected showed 
that the omission was intentional.136 
In section 101(a)(20), Congress defined “lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence” as “the status of having been lawfully accorded the 
privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in 
accordance with the immigration laws.”137  Lanier v. Attorney General138 
took this definition to describe “a particular immigration status, without any 
regard for how or when that status is obtained.”139  The court reasoned that 
 
 128. Lanier, 631 F.3d at 1366. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See Negrete-Ramirez, 741 F.3d at 1053 (noting that when a statute includes an 
explicit definition, the court must follow the definition “unless doing so is not possible in a 
particular context”); Hanif, 694 F.3d at 484 (“Absent any indication to the contrary, we must 
presume that Congress intended to give those terms the meaning ascribed to them elsewhere 
in the statute.”); see also Husic, 776 F.3d at 63–64; Stanovsek, 768 F.3d at 517; Negrete-
Ramirez, 741 F.3d at 1052; Papazoglou, 725 F.3d at 793–94. 
 131. INA § 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2012). 
 132. Bracamontes v. Holder, 675 F.3d 380, 385 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Negrete-
Ramirez, 741 F.3d at 1051 (deciding “admission” means “passage into the country from 
abroad at a port of entry”). 
 133. See, e.g., Negrete-Ramirez, 741 F.3d at 1051; Papazoglou, 725 F.3d at 793–94; 
Leiba, 699 F.3d at 350–51; Hanif, 694 F.3d at 484–85; Bracamontes, 675 F.3d at 385–86; 
Lanier, 631 F.3d at 1366–67; Martinez, 519 F.3d at 543–44. 
 134. Martinez, 519 F.3d at 545. 
 135. Immigration Technical Corrections Act of 1997, H.R. 2413, 105th Cong. § 4(a) 
(1997).  The proposed amendment would have added, “(D) In the case of an alien adjusted to 
the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, such alien shall be regarded 
as having been admitted on the date of such adjustment.” 
 136. Martinez, 519 F.3d at 545. 
 137. INA § 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(2) (2012). 
 138. 631 F.3d 1363 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 139. Id. at 1366. 
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the phrase encompassed all persons with LPR status.  If section 212(h) used 
that term alone, it would mean that all LPRs were barred from relief.140  
However, using the statutorily defined terms “admission” and “lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence” in conjunction described a particular 
status and the process used to obtain that status, thus narrowing the class of 
LPRs barred from seeking the waiver.141  Using both terms together was a 
“very strong indication that [Congress] intended that each term would serve 
a distinct purpose.”142 
With the statutory definitions substituted into the provision in question, 
section 212(h) reads: 
No waiver shall be granted under this subsection in the case of an alien 
who has previously lawfully entered into the United States after 
inspection and authorization by an immigration officer as an alien with 
the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing 
permanently in the United States as an immigrant . . . .143 
 Those LPRs who entered the country in a different status (or without 
status) and did not become LPRs until after adjustment did not have an 
“admission” in LPR status within the plain meaning of section 212(h).144  
Therefore, they remained eligible to seek a waiver of inadmissibility even if 
they had been convicted of aggravated felonies or failed to meet the 
continuous residence requirement.145  This reading, said the Fourth Circuit, 
“accords section 212(h) its plain meaning and properly utilizes the 
definitions of terms Congress provided in the INA.”146 
Furthermore, if Congress wanted to bar all LPRs from applying for a 
212(h) waiver, it could have done so using much simpler language.147  For 
example, Congress could have said:  “No waiver shall be granted under this 
subsection in the case of a lawful permanent resident.”148  If Congress 
meant to withhold 212(h) relief from all LPRs who failed to meet the 
statutory conditions, the phrase “previously . . . admitted to the United 
States” would be mere surplusage.149  By employing both defined terms 
together, rather than using a simpler construction, Congress indicated its 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id.; Stanovsek v. Holder, 768 F.3d 515, 519 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Each defined term 
adds its own meaning to that phrase:  the first refers to a type of entry into this country, while 
the second refers to a certain status . . . .”); see also Negrete-Ramirez v. Holder, 741 F.3d 
1047, 1051–54 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 142. Leiba v. Holder, 699 F.3d 346, 355 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 143. Bracamontes v. Holder, 675 F.3d 380, 385–86 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Husic v. 
Holder, 776 F.3d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 2015); Stanovsek, 768 F.3d at 517. 
 144. Bracamontes, 675 F.3d at 385. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See, e.g., Stanovsek, 768 F.3d at 517; Negrete-Ramirez v. Holder, 741 F.3d 1047, 
1053 (4th Cir. 2014); Lanier v. Att’y Gen., 631 F.3d 1363, 1366 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 148. Stanovsek, 768 F.3d at 517. 
 149. Bracamontes, 675 F.3d at 386.  Interpretations that would render certain statutory 
language redundant or otherwise superfluous are disfavored. See, e.g., Husic v. Holder, 776 
F.3d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 2015); Negrete-Ramirez, 741 F.3d at 1053. 
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intent to bar only those LPRs who initially entered the country as such.150  
The courts presumed that, when writing a statute, Congress acts 
intentionally.151  The Seventh Circuit concluded, “We will not interpret a 
statute in a manner that renders part of it irrelevant, particularly where, as 
here, the statute has an unambiguous meaning if we simply apply the 
definition provided in the statute itself.”152  Similarly, the Fourth Circuit 
expressed that “[i]n the face of a statute’s unambiguous language, the BIA 
may not make its own administrative amendments,” and the court must give 
effect to the statute as written, even if the court or the agency disagrees with 
what Congress expressed.153  If Congress did not in fact intend what it said 
in plain words, it was up to Congress—and not the court or the BIA—to 
amend the statute.154 
2.  The Immigration Rule of Lenity 
As further support for a narrow reading of the statute, several courts 
invoked the immigration rule of lenity.155  In criminal law, the rule of lenity 
requires courts to construe ambiguities in favor of the defendant because of 
the “overwhelming constitutional concerns associated with punishment and 
depriving an individual of life, liberty, or property.”156  Although 
deportation and pre-removal detention are not considered criminal 
punishments,157 the Supreme Court has said that, in the immigration 
context, ambiguities affecting deportation should be resolved in favor of the 
noncitizen because of the drastic consequences of removal.158 
Although the courts did not find any ambiguity around the term 
“admitted” in section 212(h), application of the rule of lenity—reading the 
phrase to exclude AOS subsequent to entry—provided an additional 
argument for narrowly construing the statute in favor of allowing the 
respondents to seek a waiver of inadmissibility.159 
 
 150. Hanif v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 479, 484 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 151. See, e.g., id. 
 152. Papazoglou v. Holder, 725 F.3d 790, 794 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 153. Bracamontes, 675 F.3d at 387. 
 154. Id. at 389. 
 155. See, e.g., Negrete-Ramirez v. Holder, 741 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2014); Lanier v. 
Att’y Gen., 631 F.3d 1363, 1367 n.4 (11th Cir. 2011); Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 
544 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 156. Soares, supra note 41, at 933; see also Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of 
Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 515 (2003). 
 157. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984).  Many scholars have 
called for stronger procedural safeguards for detained immigrants, arguing that deportation is 
akin to criminal punishment. See, e.g., Cesar Cuauhtemoc Garcia Hernandez, Immigration 
Detention As Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1346 (2014); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New 
Path of Immigration Law:  Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 28 
IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 679 (2007). 
 158. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 
U.S. 421, 449 (1987); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948); see also Slocum, 
supra note 156, at 521–23; Soares, supra note 41, at 933. 
 159. See, e.g., Martinez, 519 F.3d at 544. 
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C.  The BIA and the Eighth Circuit 
Just over two years after the Martinez decision, in Matter of 
Koljenovic,160 the BIA came to the opposite conclusion on 212(h) eligibility 
bars.  Unlike Martinez, who entered the United States with a valid 
nonimmigrant visa and later adjusted status, Koljenovic had entered without 
inspection.161  He later adjusted status and was convicted of second-degree 
organized fraud three years later.162  Koljenovic found himself in removal 
proceedings when he sought to reenter the country after a brief trip 
abroad.163  The IJ found that Koljenovic was ineligible for a 212(h) waiver 
because he did not have the requisite seven years of lawful continuous 
presence from the date of his AOS.164  On appeal, Koljenovic argued that 
the continuous presence bar should not apply to him because his AOS 
should not be considered an “admission” as an LPR.165 
The BIA agreed that Koljenovic’s adjustment was not an “admission” by 
the “limited definitions” in section 101(a)(13)(A).166  Nonetheless, it argued 
that Koljenovic’s adjustment was an admission for purposes of section 
212(h), reading that provision in the context of the INA as a whole and with 
legislative history in mind.167  The BIA had held in prior cases that an AOS 
could be an “admission” in some contexts:  in Matter of Rosas,168 it found 
that a noncitizen who entered without inspection and later adjusted to LPR 
status had been “admitted” as an LPR for purposes of section 237(a)(2); in 
Matter of Shanu,169 in the same context, it found a person admitted as a 
nonimmigrant visitor who subsequently adjusted status also had been 
“admitted” as an LPR upon his AOS.170 
The BIA distinguished Martinez because the respondent in that case had 
been lawfully admitted as a nonimmigrant visitor and later adjusted his 
status.171  The Fifth Circuit had not considered whether its holding would 
apply in a case like Koljenovic’s, where the noncitizen had never previously 
been admitted in any lawful status.172  Applying the Martinez rule in every 
case, the agency said, would create an absurd result:  LPRs like Koljenovic 
 
 160. 25 I. & N. Dec. 219 (B.I.A. 2010). 
 161. Id. at 219. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 219–20. 
 165. Id. at 220. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 220–25. 
 168. 22 I. & N. Dec. 616 (B.I.A. 1999) (en banc). 
 169. 23 I. & N. Dec. 754 (B.I.A. 2005), vacated, Aremu v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 450 
F.3d 578 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 170. The BIA noted other sections of the INA that equate adjustment and admission:  
sections 245(a) and (i) authorize the Attorney General to adjust a person’s status to that of an 
“alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence,” and section 245(b) instructs the Attorney 
General to treat the date AOS was granted as the date of lawful admission for permanent 
residence for recording purposes. Matter of Koljenovic, 25 I. & N. Dec. 219, 221 (B.I.A. 
2010). 
 171. Id. at 223. 
 172. Id. 
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would be left without any date of admission within the meaning of section 
101(a)(13), which would make them subject to grounds of inadmissibility 
and ineligible for various forms of relief.173  Such a result would be 
inconsistent with the overall structure of the INA and would create 
incongruities among its statutory provisions.174  Instead, the BIA found that 
resolving the statutory provision to bar all LPRs who failed the aggravated 
felony and continuous residence requirements was “far more consistent 
with the overall structure of the Act regarding the eligibility of aliens for 
relief under the relevant provisions of section 212(h) and for other 
analogous relief.”175  Applying Matter of Rosas, the BIA concluded that no 
LPR who lacked the requisite continuous presence or failed to meet other 
statutory conditions could be eligible for a 212(h) waiver, regardless of how 
the LPR was “admitted” to that status.176  The agency has since reaffirmed 
that holding in jurisdictions where controlling circuit law does not hold 
otherwise.177 
Only one court of appeals has chosen to side with the BIA and to bar all 
LPRs from applying for 212(h) relief if they have an aggravated felony or 
lack continuous presence.  In March 2014, the Eighth Circuit issued Roberts 
v. Holder.178  Unlike the respondent in Koljenovic, Shaun Roberts had been 
inspected and admitted at a port of entry as a nonimmigrant visitor, later 
adjusting status and becoming an LPR.179  The court declined to follow the 
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits—which by that time followed 
Martinez—and instead became the first court of appeals to find section 
212(h) ambiguous.180  Despite the fact that it was departing from its sister 
circuits, the court wrote a brief opinion.  It argued that, reading section 
212(h) in isolation, 
one might conclude, as our sister circuits have, that the meaning of 
“admitted” is clear . . . [and] apply the aggravated felony bar only to those 
who obtained LPR status at the port of entry to the United States.  
However, the immigration statutes as a whole . . . do not treat the words 
“admitted” and “admission” consistently.181 
Section 212(h) was thus susceptible to multiple interpretations.182  Moving 
to Chevron Step Two, the court found the BIA’s construction of the 
provision reasonable because the INA as a whole might fairly be read to 
treat post-entry adjustment as a proxy for inspection at the border.183  
Therefore, it deferred to the agency. 
 
 173. Id. at 223–24. 
 174. Id. at 221. 
 175. Id. at 224. 
 176. Id. at 225. 
 177. Matter of Rodriguez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 784, 789 (B.I.A. 2012). 
 178. 745 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 179. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text. 
 180. Roberts, 745 F.3d at 932. 
 181. Id. at 933. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 932–33. 
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The Government, the Eighth Circuit, and the dissenting judges in the 
majority courts all argued that section 212(h) was ambiguous as to which 
LPRs were barred from eligibility and that the BIA’s interpretation should 
therefore get Chevron deference.184  In arguing that the statute was 
ambiguous, they invoked the absurdity doctrine, referenced the meaning of 
“admission” in other INA provisions, and invoked legislative history and 
purpose.  This section presents those arguments. 
1.  The Meaning of “Admission” in Other Provisions of the INA 
Makes the Use of “Admitted” in 212(h) Ambiguous 
The Eighth Circuit held that “previously been admitted . . . as an alien 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence” was ambiguous without 
explicitly explaining how.185  In Bracamontes v. Holder,186 the dissent 
offered an explanation:  section 212(h) used the term “admitted” to refer to 
an “entry” but also used the phrase “lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence,” which refers to AOS.187  While the majority read those terms 
together to clearly refer to LPRs who had not entered the country in that 
status, the dissent argued that the parallel use of “admission” in one sense to 
refer to an “entry” and in another sense to refer to “status” created 
confusion and ambiguity as to the meaning of the word “admitted” in the 
provision.188  The BIA resolved that ambiguity by reading section 212(h) 
consistently with other INA provisions that used AOS as a proxy for 
admission.189 
The Government frequently argued that the statutory provision in section 
212(h) cannot be read in isolation but instead must be read in the context of 
the entire INA.190  Several other provisions in the INA consider an AOS an 
“admission,” and the 212(h) bar should be read that way as well.191 
In Hanif v. Attorney General,192 the Government pointed out that section 
245(b) of the INA directs the Attorney General to treat the date that a 
noncitizen adjusted status as the date of lawful admission for permanent 
residence for recording purposes.193  Therefore, it argued, the petitioner’s 
AOS could be read as an “admission” as an LPR for section 212(h) 
purposes.194  Similarly, the Government in Leiba v. Holder195 argued that 
 
 184. See, e.g., Stanovsek v. Holder, 768 F.3d 515, 521 (6th Cir. 2014) (Boggs, J., 
dissenting); Bracamontes v. Holder, 675 F.3d 380, 390 (4th Cir. 2012) (Niemeyer, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 185. See Roberts, 745 F.3d at 932. 
 186. 675 F.3d 380 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 187. Id. at 390, 392 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 390. 
 190. See, e.g., Hanif v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 479, 484 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 191. See, e.g., id. at 485; Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 545 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 192. 694 F.3d 479 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 193. Id. at 485. 
 194. Id.  The majority responded that the recording provision in section 245(b) was 
simply a “ministerial provision relating to the monitoring and control of the number of visas 
available in any given year, rather than an effort by Congress to amend the definitions of 
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the use of AOS as a proxy for admission in section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) should 
inform the reading of 212(h).196 
The dissent in Stanovsek v. Holder197 pointed to three provisions in the 
INA that use the same “alien . . . admitted . . . as an alien lawfully admitted 
for permanent residence” language as section 212(h) but interpret the 
noncitizen’s AOS as an admission:  sections 201(c), 216, and 216A.198  
Section 201(c) involves computing the number of family-sponsored visas 
available in a given year and says that a noncitizen “subsequently admitted 
as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence” shall not again be 
counted as “admitted.”199  Sections 216 and 216A say that LPRs who 
entered the country and later adjusted status based upon marriage to a U.S. 
citizen shall be considered to “have been admitted” as LPRs.200  The dissent 
argued that, in these provisions, the language mirrored section 212(h) but 
allowed for an AOS to equal an admission—the distinction between 
physical entry and status did not matter in those statutes, so it should not 
matter in 212(h).201 
The majority courts rejected arguments that the way “admission” was 
used in other parts of the INA had any impact on the reading of section 
212(h).  According to the majority courts, there are other sections of the 
INA where the absence of an “admission” as defined in section 
101(a)(13)(A) might permit using the date of AOS as the date of admission 
for practical purposes, such as in removal provisions or cancellation of 
removal.202  But in those provisions, the terms “admission” or “admitted” 
are followed by “in any status” or left unqualified.203  In section 212(h), the 
concurrent use of “admitted” and “lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence”—terms of art separately defined in the INA—works 
differently.204 
 
‘admitted’ and ‘lawfully admitted for permanent residence’ set forth in § 1101(a).” Id.; see 
also Stanovsek v. Holder, 768 F.3d 515, 518–19 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 195. 699 F.3d 346 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 196. Id. at 354. 
 197. 768 F.3d 515 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 198. Id. at 521–22 (Boggs, J., dissenting). 
 199. Id. at 522. 
 200. Id. at 523. 
 201. Id. at 521–22.  The majority in Stanovsek analyzed each section in turn, finding that 
because those statutes dealt with “admission” in very specific contexts—parole and 
naturalization—they did not shed light on the terms’ meanings in the context of section 
212(h). Id. at 520. 
 202. See, e.g., Negrete-Ramirez v. Holder, 741 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2014); Leiba v. 
Holder, 699 F.3d 346, 354 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 203. Negrete-Ramirez, 741 F.3d at 1053. 
 204. Id. at 1052–54; see also Hanif v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 479, 486 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(noting that the “omission of this additional modifier creates a significant distinction”); 
Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 546 (5th Cir. 2008). 
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2.  Absurdity Arguments 
In arguing against the majority construction of section 212(h), the 
Government frequently invoked the absurdity doctrine,205 arguing that a 
plain reading of the provision would lead to ridiculous results that Congress 
could not have intended.  Their arguments pointed to two bizarre results in 
particular:  impermissible incongruities with other INA provisions and 
irrational distinctions among different types of LPRs. 
First, the Government argued that the meaning of “admission” in section 
212(h) should be read the same way as in other sections of the INA that 
treat an AOS as an admission.206  Relatedly, the Government argued that 
failing to read section 212(h) that way would lead to absurd results and to 
incongruities with other provisions of the INA, because some noncitizens 
would be left without any official admission.  In Leiba, where the petitioner 
had entered the United States illegally and adjusted status through an 
employment-based petition, the Government argued that applying 
Congress’s definition of “admission” literally would produce the absurd 
result that those who never lawfully entered the country would be ineligible 
to apply for cancellation of removal under INA section 240A (because they 
had no admission) but would be eligible for a 212(h) waiver.207  The 
Government presumed that Congress intended to create congruity between 
sections 212(h) and 240A.208  The Government reasoned that, as the 
requirements in section 240A applied to all LPRs regardless of their mode 
of attaining that status, the 212(h) continuous residence requirements 
should also apply to all LPRs.209  In considering this argument, the majority 
courts found that Congress clearly did not intend the word “admitted” to 
read the same way in both contexts.  The sections differed in a significant 
way:  in 240A the seven-year continuous-residence requirement applied to 
LPRs “after having been admitted in any status.”210  In 240A, Congress did 
not use “admitted” in conjunction with “lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence.”211  The “omission of this additional modifier” created a 
distinction between the two sections.212  Additionally, although it might be 
 
 205. See United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 486–87 (1868) (“General terms 
should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd 
consequence.  It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions 
to its language, which would avoid results of this character.”). 
 206. See supra notes 191–201 and accompanying text. 
 207. Leiba, 699 F.3d at 354. 
 208. The BIA pointed to a House Conference Report to support its presumption:  “The 
managers intend that the provisions governing continuous residence set forth in INA section 
240A as enacted by this legislation shall be applied as well for purposes of waivers under 
INA section 212(h).” Matter of Koljenovic, 25 I. & N. Dec. 219, 222 (B.I.A. 2010) (citing 
H.R. REP. No. 104-828, at 228 (1996) (Conf. Rep.)). 
 209. Leiba, 699 F.3d at 354. 
 210. Id.; Hanif v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 479, 485 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 211. Hanif, 694 F.3d at 485. 
 212. Id. at 486.  Because Congress amended INA sections 212(h), 240A, and 
101(a)(13)(A) at the same time, these textual differences were likely intentional. Id. at 484.  
When Congress includes particular language in one section and omits it in another, it acts 
purposefully in its disparate exclusion or inclusion. See Leiba, 699 F.3d at 354. 
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strange that LPRs who entered illegally and later adjusted status were left 
with no technical admission, the court in Hanif stated that Congress had 
“long been aware of the fact that aliens may enter the country without 
inspection and later adjust.”213  While the situation was “awkward,” it was 
not absurd; the courts would not substitute their judgment for that of 
Congress.214 
Second, the BIA and the Government pointed out that barring some 
LPRs from 212(h) eligibility but not others led to absurd distinctions—both 
(1) between those who entered illegally and those who entered lawfully, and 
(2) between LPRs who went through consular processing and those who 
adjusted status. 
In Koljenovic, the BIA emphasized that Congress could not have 
intended for a noncitizen who entered the country illegally, and then 
received the privilege of adjusting status, to be immune from restrictions on 
seeking 212(h) protection, while leaving a person who had gone through 
consular processing to be admitted as an LPR to suffer those restrictions.215  
The Government and dissents found it unfair that the majority interpretation 
of section 212(h) would impose harsher terms on those who entered legally 
than on any other category of entrants, “including not only those who enter, 
for example, as tourists and later adjust their status, but even those who 
sneak across the border; those who overstay their visas; or those who 
violate any other type of entry requirement—by lying about qualifications, 
past history, or affiliations for example.”216  Judge Niemeyer, dissenting in 
Bracamontes, expressed that “[i]t is difficult to fathom why Congress 
would have wished to bar aliens who lawfully entered the United States 
with [LPR] status from reaping the benefits of section 212(h)[,] while 
permitting aliens who illegally entered the country” to reap those 
benefits.217  Such a reading of the statute would create perverse 
incentives.218 
The BIA also reasoned that Congress could not have intended to 
distinguish those who had acquired LPR status through consular processing 
from those “whose admission occurred through adjustment of status.”219  
The dissent in Stanovsek argued that there is no material difference between 
one who enters the country as an LPR and one who adjusts status following 
entry, so there is no sensible explanation for why the statute would treat 
 
 213. Hanif, 694 F.3d at 487. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Matter of Koljenovic, 25 I. & N. Dec. 219, 223 (B.I.A. 2010). 
 216. Stanovsek v. Holder, 768 F.3d 515, 523 (6th Cir. 2014) (Boggs, J., dissenting).  The 
dissent framed this disparate treatment as an absurdity rather than an equal protection issue.  
Courts have consistently rejected equal protection challenges to section 212(h). See, e.g., 
Bracamontes v. Holder, 675 F.3d 380, 388–89 n.5 (4th Cir. 2012); Hanif, 694 F.3d at 486 
(finding section 212(h) constitutional under rational basis review because Congress could 
have had good reasons for the 212(h) distinction). 
 217. Bracamontes, 675 F.3d at 393 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Koljenovic, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 224. 
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LPRs disparately based on the procedure used to acquire that status.220  In 
Martinez, the Government argued that IIRIRA reforms were meant to 
expedite removal of “criminal aliens”; it would therefore be unreasonable to 
suggest that Congress intended to distinguish between LPRs guilty of the 
same crimes based on whether they entered the country as LPRs or adjusted 
status post-entry.221 
The Fifth Circuit majority found that the distinctions above were not 
necessarily absurd.222  There were rational reasons for Congress to 
distinguish between different types of LPRs based on how they acquired 
that status.223  First, it was possible that Congress intended to take an 
incremental approach to reaching its ultimate goals.224  Second, Congress 
may have felt that LPRs who adjusted status inside the country rather than 
entering as green-card holders were more deserving of eligibility for a 
waiver because they likely grew up in this country, developed strong ties 
here, and had more citizen relatives who would be adversely affected by 
their removal.225  Ultimately, all that mattered was “that there are 
countervailing explanations for the statutory distinction between ‘admitted’ 
and ‘adjustment,’ which are just as plausible, if not more so, than the 
Government’s contention that such a reading would lead to an absurd 
result.”226 
The dissenters in both Bracamontes and Stanovsek argued that the BIA’s 
interpretation, which treats all LPRs alike for purposes of section 212(h), 
was a more rational reading of the statute.227  Ultimately, the majority 
courts felt that, while a distinction based on manner of admission “appears 
to make little sense” and may leave readers and judges alike asking why 
“Congress [would] distinguish between those who obtained [LPR] status at 
the time of lawful entry and those who adjusted status later, for purposes of 
barring permanent residents who have committed aggravated felonies from 
discretionary hardship relief,” the courts’ own inability to answer that 
question did not warrant expanding the scope of the provision beyond the 
clearly limited meaning expressed in the text.228 
 
 220. Stanovsek, 768 F.3d at 523 (Boggs, J., dissenting). 
 221. Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 544 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 544–45. 
 224. Id. at 545.  In equal protection cases, for example, the legislature was permitted to 
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 227. Stanovsek v. Holder, 768 F.3d 515, 523 (6th Cir. 2014) (Boggs, J., dissenting); 
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 228. Stanovsek, 768 F.3d at 520. 
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3.  Arguments for Deference to the BIA 
Finally, the Government and the dissents placed greater emphasis on the 
need to defer to the BIA, implicitly invoking the plenary power doctrine.  In 
his dissent in Stanovsek, Judge Boggs noted, “[J]udicial deference to the 
Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration context.”229  
Because the statute allowed for meanings other than that which the majority 
adopted, courts should defer to the BIA on its interpretation of section 
212(h).230  Similarly, Judge Niemeyer of the Fourth Circuit argued, in 
Bracamontes, “When a statute yields two plausible constructions, we 
should defer to the agency, especially when the statue pertains to 
immigration matters.”231 
D.  Supreme Court Deference to the BIA:  
Where Is the Court Headed? 
While there is little scholarly discussion regarding the dispute over 
section 212(h) in particular,232 theories about how the Supreme Court has 
handled questions of deference to the BIA over statutory interpretation help 
illuminate how it might address 212(h).  As discussed in Part I, the Court 
has historically been reticent to second-guess the BIA in matters involving 
immigration policy and INA interpretation.  However, recent Supreme 
Court jurisprudence paints a surprisingly more complicated picture.  This 
section reviews decisions from the 2009 to 2013 Terms that addressed 
whether to defer to the BIA’s interpretation of various INA provisions.233 
1.  2009–2013:  Opinions Withholding Deference 
In Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder,234 the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to resolve a circuit split over whether subsequent simple possession 
offenses are aggravated felonies.235  ICE placed an LPR previously 
convicted of two misdemeanor drug offenses in removal proceedings.236  
 
 229. Id. at 523–24 (Boggs, J., dissenting). 
 230. Id. 
 231. Bracamontes, 675 F.3d at 390 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 232. In the world of scholarship, discussion of conflicting interpretations of section 
212(h) take place almost exclusively in practitioners’ guides or immigration news releases. 
See, e.g., DAN KESSELBRENNER & LORY D. ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW & CRIMES 
§ 10:21 (2015); BIA Reaffirms Matter of Koljenovic Outside of the 4th, 5th, and 11th 
Circuits but Follows Contrary Circuit Precedents in Those Circuits, 89 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 926 (2012).  One journal article describes the dispute over the meaning of 
“admission” in section 212(h) alongside disputes about the meaning of “admission” in other 
sections of the INA. See Griffith, supra note 33.  Only one student note addresses the topic. 
See Viridiana G. Carreon, Note, Section 212(H) of the Immigration and Nationality Act After 
Matter of Rodriguez, 6 J. MARSHALL L.J. 145 (2012). 
 233. This Note omits immigration cases on constitutional questions and federal 
preemption. 
 234. 560 U.S. 563 (2010). 
 235. Id. at 573. 
 236. Id. at 566. 
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Although Carachuri-Rosendo had only received a ten-day sentence for his 
second offense, an IJ found that he had been “convicted” of an “aggravated 
felony” within the meaning of the INA because his conduct could have been 
prosecuted as simple possession with a recidivist enhancement under state 
law and could have been punishable as a felony under federal law.237  The 
BIA affirmed, following circuit precedent,238 and the Fifth Circuit also 
adopted the IJ’s “hypothetical approach.”239  The Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that a second or subsequent simple possession offense does not 
qualify as an aggravated felony when the state conviction was not based in 
fact on a prior conviction.240  The Court found that the hypothetical 
approach did not comport with a plain reading of the statute or the term 
“conviction.”241 
In Kucana v. Holder,242 the Court overruled the BIA on an issue that 
went to the very heart of judicial review of BIA decisions:  whether the 
INA’s preclusion of judicial review of specific discretionary 
determinations243 also extends to determinations made discretionary by 
regulation.244  The BIA had denied the petitioner’s motion to reopen his 
removal proceedings.245  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit declined 
jurisdiction because a regulation prohibited review of denials of motions to 
reopen, even though the INA did not.246  The Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that the words “specified under this subchapter” precluded judicial 
review only of determinations made discretionary by the statute.247  While 
Congress had restricted judicial review in many provisions of IIRIRA, it 
had not delegated authority to executive agencies to further restrict judicial 
review by regulation.248  Therefore, the courts of appeals had jurisdiction to 
review denials of motions to reopen by the BIA.249 
In 2011, the Supreme Court overturned another BIA interpretation in 
Judulang v. Holder.250  The Court reviewed the BIA’s “comparable 
 
 237. Id. at 570. 
 238. The BIA actually disagreed with the IJ’s reasoning and said that, in other circuits, it 
would not treat a subsequent misdemeanor conviction as an aggravated felony unless the 
conviction contained an express finding that the offender was a recidivist. In re Carachuri-
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 239. Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. at 572. 
 240. Id. at 582. 
 241. Id. at 576. 
 242. 558 U.S. 233 (2010). 
 243. INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) precludes review of 
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 244. Kucana, 558 U.S. at 237. 
 245. Id. at 236–37. 
 246. Id. at 237. 
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 248. Id. at 252. 
 249. Id. at 237. 
 250. 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011). 
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grounds” approach to applying 212(c)251 relief in deportation cases.252  
Enacted prior to IIRIRA’s elimination of the distinction between exclusion 
and deportation,253 212(c) only waived grounds for exclusion on its face.  
To determine whether section 212(c) could relieve a particular deportation 
ground, the BIA’s practice was to ask whether that ground consisted of a set 
of crimes substantially equivalent to those included in the exclusion 
grounds.  If so, it could be waived under section 212(c); if not, the offense 
was not waiveable.254 
In a unanimous decision by Justice Kagan, the Court emphatically 
overruled the comparable-grounds approach as arbitrary and capricious.255  
In doing so, it stated, “When an administrative agency sets policy, it must 
provide a reasoned explanation for its action.  That is not a high bar, but it 
is an unwavering one.”256  The Court conducted its analysis under the 
Administrative Procedure Act257 (APA) rather than using Chevron because 
it said that it was not dealing with an agency interpretation of statutory text, 
but rather with an agency policy alleged to be unfair.258  It noted, however, 
that its analysis would be similar under Chevron.259  The Court emphasized, 
“The BIA’s approach must be tied, even if loosely, to the purposes of the 
immigration laws or the appropriate operation of the immigration 
system.”260  The policy here was “unmoored from the purposes and 
concerns of the immigration laws.”261  The Court emphasized that the 
agency must have an especially tight rationale when removal—a matter of 
“utmost importance”262—was involved. 
In two more cases, the Court declined to defer to the BIA’s 
interpretations of the INA.  In Vartelas v. Holder,263 the Court overturned 
the BIA’s retroactive application of an IIRIRA amendment that affected the 
ability of LPRs to travel without consequences after a conviction.264  
Vartelas, a long-term LPR, had pled guilty to a felony in 1994; in 2003, he 
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 255. Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 479. 
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 261. Id. at 490. 
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 263. 132 S. Ct. 1479 (2012). 
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was placed in removal proceedings upon his return from a weeklong trip 
abroad.265  The question at issue was whether the BIA was correct in 
retroactively applying the 1996 amendment to Vartelas and other LPRs 
whose convictions occurred prior to 1996.266  Writing for the majority, 
Justice Ginsburg relied on the presumption against retroactive legislation 
and overturned the BIA’s holding.267 
In Moncrieffe v. Holder,268 the issue was whether a conviction under a 
state criminal law constituted a “felony punishable under the Controlled 
Substance Act” thus making it an aggravated felony.269  The Court 
overruled the BIA’s interpretation, holding that a conviction under state law 
criminalizing possession of small amounts of drugs did not constitute an 
aggravated felony requiring removal.270  Like Carachuri-Rosendo, 
Moncrieffe dealt largely with the interpretation of criminal statutes cross-
referenced in the INA’s definition of “aggravated felony,” rather than with a 
specific provision of the INA. 
2.  2009–2013:  Opinions Granting Deference 
During the 2009 to 2013 Terms, the Court deferred to the BIA on issues 
of statutory interpretation in at least three cases.  In Kawashima v. 
Holder,271 the Court agreed with the BIA’s interpretation and application of 
section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA, which says that anyone who is 
convicted of an offense involving fraud or deceit in which the loss to the 
victim exceeds a certain amount of money has committed an aggravated 
felony.272  The Court found that the statutory text unambiguously made the 
petitioners’ crimes—related to falsifying tax returns—aggravated felonies, 
as they necessarily entailed deceit.273  While the Court acknowledged that it 
had on some occasions construed ambiguities in deportation statutes in 
noncitizens’ favor, it refused to apply the rule of lenity in this case because 
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“the application of the present statute [was] clear enough that resort to the 
rule of lenity [was] not warranted.”274 
In Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez,275 Justice Kagan wrote for a unanimous 
Court, deferring to the BIA’s construction of section 240A.276  The 
noncitizens in Martinez Gutierrez asked that their parents’ continuous 
presence in LPR status be imputed to them to satisfy the statute’s 
requirements for cancellation of removal.277  The BIA ruled that each 
noncitizen seeking cancellation of removal must satisfy the statute’s 
requirements on her own.278  The Supreme Court found that, because there 
was no mention in the text of whether imputation should be allowed, the 
statute was ambiguous.279  Under Chevron, it found the BIA’s interpretation 
reasonable and deferred to the agency.280 
Most recently, the Court deferred to the BIA’s statutory interpretation of 
the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA) in Scialabba v. Cuellar de 
Osorio.281  The CSPA was enacted to remedy the problem of “aging out”—
when a child reached the age of twenty-one before her parent’s visa 
application was processed, and thus no longer qualified as a derivative 
“child” under INA section 101(b)(1), she fell to the back of the visa line or 
lost eligibility completely.282  The CSPA provision at issue provided a 
formula for calculating the “age” of an aged-out noncitizen to permit them 
to still qualify for a visa.  The question presented was whether that 
provision granted a remedy to all noncitizens who had been derivatives on 
family-based petitions but no longer qualified by the time a visa became 
available.283  The BIA interpreted the CSPA as providing relief only to 
those who could have qualified as principal beneficiaries of their own visa 
petitions, as opposed to those who only initially qualified for a visa as 
derivative beneficiaries.284 
Justice Kagan’s plurality opinion determined that the statute at issue was 
ambiguous and had more than one possible reasonable construction.285  The 
Court consulted dictionaries, referred to congressional usage of the terms at 
issue in other statutes, and compared other parts of the CSPA.286  
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Ultimately, it decided the provision was internally contradictory, which 
“ma[de] possible alternative reasonable constructions.”287  The ambiguity 
in the statute permitted the BIA to distinguish among aged-out beneficiaries 
in the manner it had chosen.288  Kagan concluded, 
This is the kind of case Chevron was built for.  Whatever Congress might 
have meant in enacting § 1153(h)(3), it failed to speak clearly.  
Confronted with a self-contradictory, ambiguous provision in a complex 
statutory scheme, the Board chose a textually reasonable construction 
consonant with its view of the purpose and policies underlying 
immigration law.  Were we to overturn the Board in that circumstance, we 
would assume as our own the responsible and expert agency’s role.289 
The concurring and dissenting opinions reflected great disagreement 
among the Justices over statutory interpretation and agency deference.  
Justice Roberts (joined by Justice Scalia) concurred in the judgment but 
found ambiguity for different reasons.290  Justice Alito, dissenting, 
acknowledged that the provision at issue was “brief and cryptic” and “may 
well contain a great deal of ambiguity, which the [BIA] in its expertise is 
free to resolve,” but felt the BIA ignored certain statutory commands in 
resolving the issue.291 
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting, criticized the plurality’s application of 
Chevron, saying that 
unlike in the usual Chevron case, where ambiguity derives from the fact 
that the text does not speak with sufficient specificity to the question at 
issue, the plurality argues that this is a case in which ambiguity can only 
arise—if it is to arise at all—if Congress has spoken clearly on the issue 
in diametrically opposing ways.292 
She argued that, when confronted with a statute that seems internally 
contradictory, the Court should find ways to read it coherently rather than 
assuming that Congress messed up.293  “As judicious as it can be to defer to 
administrative agencies, our foremost duty is, and always has been, to give 
effect to the law as drafted by Congress.”294  Sotomayor offered several 
interpretations showing that Congress had spoken clearly to the issue of 
conversion and thus ended the analysis at Chevron Step One.295 
3.  Theory About Deference in the Immigration Context 
What do these recent cases mean for the Supreme Court’s current 
approach to deference in the immigration context?  In the late twentieth 
century, some scholars suggested that the plenary power doctrine was dying 
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out296 but made a brief comeback post-9/11.297  Kevin Johnson 
hypothesizes that recent Supreme Court immigration decisions suggest that 
the plenary power doctrine is again headed toward its ultimate demise, 
noting that during the 2009 to 2013 Terms, a “conservative Supreme Court 
characterized by some observers as ideologically extreme, has consistently 
followed generally applicable legal principles in its immigration 
decisions.”298  Instead of applying extreme deference in the immigration 
context, Johnson argues, the Roberts Court “consistently has applied 
ordinary, standard, and unremarkable legal doctrines in ordinary, standard, 
and unremarkable ways.”299  This trend, he argues, may point to a 
realigning of immigration law with “conventional norms of judicial 
review.”300  In fact, Johnson says that “[i]t is difficult to discern 
significantly different treatment of immigration matters by the Court and 
any deviation from conventional legal doctrines” in the past few Terms.301  
Rather, the Court has rejected the BIA’s interpretations when it concludes 
that they are based on erroneous readings of the INA, and it is willing to 
defer to the BIA’s reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes.302 
Other scholars, like Shruti Rana, do not agree that the Supreme Court is 
backing away from extreme deference in the immigration context.303  Rana 
argues that recent jurisprudence in fact expands agency authority and gives 
the judiciary a back seat in deciding immigration matters.304  Rana’s main 
thesis is that, in the immigration context, the Supreme Court is transforming 
Chevron’s division of interpretive decision-making authority (between the 
federal courts and agencies) in ways that “may threaten to reshape 
deference jurisprudence by handing more power to the immigration agency 
just when the agency may be least able to handle that power effectively.”305 
Rana believes increased deference to the BIA is especially disturbing 
given the current state of the agency.306  Due in part to being 
underresourced and overburdened, as well as to procedural changes 
internally,307 many judges and scholars have noted a decline in the quality 
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of BIA review and have increasingly called for reform.308  Federal judges 
across the country have acknowledged the inadequate performance of the 
BIA.309  Critics say the agency is plagued with significant problems 
including a backlog of cases, potential bias, widely inconsistent decision 
making, and endemic mistakes.310  Rana criticizes the agency as one 
“whose decision-making processes are rapidly decaying, one that is 
increasingly unable to produce coherent decisions, much less high-quality 
ones,” and one that should receive little deference from the courts for its 
statutory construction.311  Instead, she laments, the Court has “increasingly 
tilted the balance of power toward[] the agency by limiting judicial 
interpretive authority in favor of agency deference.”312 
The lively debate over the current state of judicial deference to the BIA 
has played out in analyses of cases from the Court’s 2009–2013 Terms.  
Kevin Johnson focuses on the Court’s use of traditional rules of statutory 
interpretation in recent immigration cases as a signal of normalized review.  
In Carachuri-Rosendo, he says, the Court followed a traditional approach to 
statutory interpretation and administrative deference in analyzing the statute 
at issue.313  It examined the ordinary meanings of statutory terms, consulted 
dictionary definitions,314 invoked the immigration rule of lenity,315 and 
found that the Government’s position ignored the plain language of the 
INA.316  Johnson thinks the use of traditional tools of statutory 
interpretation suggests the Court’s willingness to withhold deference from 
the BIA when the plain meaning of the statute requires it.317  He points out 
that the Court’s decision in Kucana supports a theory of normalization in 
immigration jurisprudence because the Court chose to protect the right to 
judicial review, in tension with the plenary power doctrine’s immunity from 
judicial scrutiny.318 
In contrast to Johnson’s depiction of normalized immigration 
jurisprudence, Matthew Soares views Martinez Gutierrez and Kawashima 
as “highly illustrative of a dangerous trend in the field of immigration law,” 
in which the Court has engaged in less judicial scrutiny and less lenity.319  
Both cases involved the meaning of statutes used to remove long-term 
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permanent residents that were open to multiple interpretations.320  The 
result of the Court’s holdings in both cases was to restrict available relief 
and to render more noncitizens removable.321  Johnson, on the other hand, 
depicts the dispute between the majority and the dissent in Kawashima as 
nothing more than differences of opinion over the proper way to interpret a 
statute.322  He emphasizes the normality of Kawashima in administrative 
law decisions323 and calls Martinez Gutierrez a “run-of-the-mill Chevron 
deference case.”324 
Judulang and Scialabba have perhaps invoked the most differing 
opinions on the issue of judicial deference.  The decision in Judulang 
surprised those following the immigration field.325  The Court unanimously 
overturned a nearly uniform bloc of circuit courts that all had sanctioned a 
BIA policy, “striking down an executive agency’s rule in a domain in which 
executive agency action has been viewed traditionally as deserving of 
special deference.”326  Jeffrey Stein finds in Judulang a hopeful expression 
of the idea that the Court is moving away from affording the BIA special 
deference.327  The Court’s use of the APA (and, alternatively, Chevron) to 
expose the BIA’s policy as arbitrary and capricious signaled that the Court 
viewed its role in immigration as no different than from that in other areas 
of ordinary jurisprudence.328  Judulang, he writes, shifted the immigration 
system, “if subtly,” toward “a more reasoned jurisprudence,” opening the 
door for future meaningful challenges to the BIA’s actions.329 
In support of his view, Stein notes that the Court did not cite a single 
plenary power case in its decision, but rather cited to quintessential and 
universally applicable administrative law cases.330  The absence of any 
discussion of plenary power, the executive’s role in immigration, or the 
unique nature of immigration, Stein argues, serves as evidence of the 
Court’s “current discomfort with—and, perhaps more precisely, disavowal 
of—allocating more deference to the executive in immigration matters than 
that branch receives in ordinary contexts.”331  Stein also argues that 
Judulang introduced a “purpose inquiry” into the Court’s deference 
analysis—by which the Court analyzes Congress’s objectives in passing the 
statute at issue, as well as the purposes and principles of the immigration 
system at large—thus deepening the substantive standard that immigration 
agencies must meet.332  Ultimately, he argues, Judulang contributes to the 
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“reigning-in” of traditional deference to executive immigration decisions.333  
Johnson, who calls Judulang “a stinging rebuke of the BIA’s reasoning and 
the U.S. government’s defense of it,” seemingly agrees.334 
Shruti Rana, on the other hand, reads Judulang much more cautiously.335  
Although the Court overturned the BIA’s decision, she worries that, by 
relying on the single-inquiry, arbitrary-and-capricious standard rather than 
Chevron’s two steps, the Court limited its potential role in reviewing 
agency decisions.336  She views Judulang as further collapsing the Chevron 
test into one step:  error checking, rather than first construing the statute 
itself.337  Still, she acknowledges a small “glimmer of hope” that the Court 
will be more open to addressing the agency’s endemic shortcomings if 
presented with similarly poorly reasoned decisions.338 
Lastly, despite its invocation of the plenary power doctrine, Kevin 
Johnson found Scialabba to be “the most recent example” of a trend away 
from special deference and toward an unexceptional analysis of 
administrative action in immigration law.339  Johnson argues that Scialabba 
was unexceptional in its application of routine administrative law 
principles, with the Justices applying similar interpretative analyses but 
reaching different conclusions.340  Other scholars, in contrast, have 
criticized the Court’s deference to the BIA in Scialabba341 and questioned 
its application of Chevron.342 
III.  RESOLVING THE CONFLICT 
Part III conducts a statutory interpretation analysis and resolves the 
arguments regarding LPR eligibility for section 212(h) presented in Part II.  
It points to the complexity of the INA as a reason for why strict 
interpretations at Chevron Step One make sense in the immigration context.  
Additionally, it addresses whether the BIA’s construction would be 
permissible if the text were actually ambiguous—making an argument for 
invoking the immigration rule of lenity.  Acknowledging that the distinction 
between LPRs who entered as such and those who adjusted to that status 
makes little practical sense, this part argues for construing the INA to afford 
immigrants more opportunities for relief.  Lastly, this part considers what 
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the current state of Supreme Court deference to the BIA means for section 
212(h). 
A.  The Meaning of Section 212(h) Is Clear 
The majority of the courts of appeals are correct:  the plain meaning of 
section 212(h) shows that the aggravated felony and continuous residence 
bars apply to only LPRs who entered the country in that status.  The 
outcome of a challenge to the BIA’s interpretation of section 212(h) in the 
Supreme Court would likely turn on whether the Court finds the provision 
at issue to be ambiguous at Chevron Step One.  The nine courts of appeals 
that held, contrary to the BIA, that LPRs who adjusted status in the United 
States could apply for a 212(h) waiver even if they failed to meet the 
conditions specified did so after finding the statute unambiguous and clear 
on its face.343  On the contrary, the BIA, the Eighth Circuit, and the 
dissenting judges found the statute’s language to be ambiguous, moved to 
Chevron Step Two, and found that deference to the agency’s construction 
of section 212(h) was reasonable.344 
Not only have the courts of appeals’s decisions followed this pattern, but 
in its recent immigration cases involving statutory interpretation, the 
Supreme Court has also followed a similar path.  The Court has ruled 
against the BIA when it found a statute unambiguously clear, in spite of 
agency arguments to the contrary that the statute was ambiguous.345  It 
deferred to the BIA, on the other hand, when it found a statutory provision 
ambiguous.346 
In reviewing the BIA’s interpretation of section 212(h), a reviewing court 
must first determine whether Congress has spoken directly to the question 
of whether all LPRs fall under the eligibility bars.347  In writing section 
212(h), Congress used two terms of art, each separately defined in the 
definitions section of the INA:  “admitted” and “lawfully admitted as a 
permanent resident.”348  With the aid of these definitions, the statute is clear 
on its face:  no waiver shall be granted under section 212(h) to noncitizens 
who have “previously been admitted to the United States” (meaning 
inspected and admitted at the border) as noncitizens “lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence” (meaning in the status of an LPR).  The phrasing in 
section 212(h) reads awkwardly because Congress intentionally combined 
two statutorily defined phrases. 
If Congress had meant for the bar to apply to all LPRs, it could have 
made that clear simply by omitting the extra (and therefore unnecessary) 
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phrase “has previously been admitted to.”349  In fact, in section 
212(h)(1)(B), which comes shortly before the phrase at issue, Congress did 
use simpler phrasing to refer to U.S.-citizen or LPR relatives of the 
potential waiver applicant:  “the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen 
of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence . . . .”350  That provision clearly refers to all LPR relatives 
regardless of their manner of acquiring that status. 
When one starts and ends with the text of section 212(h), the 
interpretative exercise is fairly straightforward.  When the text itself clearly 
identifies Congress’s intent, there is no reason for an agency or judge to 
depart from that text unless it is clear that Congress could not have meant 
what it said, as demonstrated by absurd results.351  The BIA argued for 
departure from the plain meaning because Congress could not have meant 
to create such strange distinctions between LPRs.352  However, the BIA, the 
Eighth Circuit, and the dissenting opinions all have failed to show 
satisfactorily that anything truly absurd would result from applying the 
statutory bar to LPRs who were admitted at the border in that status and not 
barring LPRs who adjusted status inside the country.  For something to be 
absurd, it should be “so gross as to shock the general moral or common 
sense.”353  The results suggested by the BIA, Eighth Circuit, and dissents 
are admittedly strange, but while the disparate treatment of LPRs based on 
technical procedural differences may seem to make little sense, such 
treatment does not make the results shocking or absurd.  There are reasons 
that Congress may have made the choices it did.354  Furthermore, the BIA 
and the government make technical distinctions among immigrants all the 
time, such as through deferred action programs and policy memoranda 
stating priorities for removal.355  By taking its current position, the BIA 
threatens to blur the line between legislative and executive authority.  When 
Congress has spoken to an issue, it is not for the BIA (or any court) to 
question its clearly manifested intent or to rewrite the statute to avoid 
results with which it disagrees.356 
The Eighth Circuit explicitly found the statutory phrase to be ambiguous 
but did not offer a clear explanation for that ambiguity.357  The court’s 
finding rested not on the wording of the provision in section 212(h), but 
instead on an attempt to establish a coherent meaning of “admission” 
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throughout the entire INA.  The court argued that, when read with other 
immigration provisions, section 212(h) might fairly be interpreted as 
treating post-entry adjustment as a substitution for inspection at the port of 
entry and therefore as an “admission.”358 
While it is important to consider a provision in the context of the full 
statute, the overall complexity of the INA and the fact that the same words 
may have different meanings when used in different ways throughout the 
statute cautions against trying to make the word “admission” read the same 
way in every provision.  The INA has been amended several times over 
several decades.359  To suggest that the words “admission” and “lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence” should mean exactly the same thing in 
every context ignores the piecemeal way the INA has developed.  If those 
terms should be read consistently with any other provisions of the INA, it is 
with the definition sections.360 
In fact, in most of the INA sections to which the Eighth Circuit, the 
dissenting opinions, and the BIA refer as examples of where an AOS was 
an “admission,” Congress explicitly stated that a noncitizen’s AOS should 
count as such only in very specific contexts.  For example, INA section 
245(a) says that the Attorney General may, in his discretion, adjust the 
status of a person lawfully admitted to the United States to that of an 
LPR361 and then record the date of AOS as the date of admission.  The 
Attorney General should then reduce the number of preference visas 
available for the year accordingly.362  This procedure applies in only very 
specific contexts and involves the Attorney General’s use of discretion to 
depart from the normal manner of recording admissions and adjustments.  It 
should not, as the dissenting opinions suggest, be read as the general mode 
of recording admissions and adjustments of status, but rather as an 
exception. 
In her concurrence in Negrete-Ramirez, Judge Berzon appreciated the 
difficulty in deciding whether to force the word “admission” in section 
212(h) to mirror other parts of the INA or to apply a plain reading of the 
statute that reflects the section 101 definitions.363  She presented a 
persuasive and concise explanation for why section 212(h) should be read 
the way the majority courts have interpreted it.  Judge Berzon admitted that 
she was first inclined to defer to the BIA’s understanding of section 212(h), 
thinking it to be informed by an acceptable interpretation of the INA as a 
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whole.364  Berzon ultimately concluded, however, that the court must apply 
a plain meaning interpretation to the statutory definitions of “admission” 
and “admitted” in the INA when it can sensibly do so.  In this case, she 
found that the juxtaposition of the statutorily defined term “admitted” with 
a second statutorily defined term (“lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence”) warranted a plain meaning approach: 
[O]therwise, the term “admitted” would be redundant of the second 
phrase.  In some instances, however, such as where there has been no 
admission of the sort contemplated by the statute, . . . [AOS] must be 
treated as admission. 
 This nuanced approach now seems to me more faithful to the 
appropriate division of responsibility between Congress and 
administrative agencies, and between such agencies and the courts, 
embodied in Chevron . . . than the BIA’s insistence on abandoning the 
plain language throughout the INA with regard to the terms “admitted” 
and “admission,” so as to avoid a context-specific approach in those 
circumstances in which the statutory definition simply will not work.365 
Berzon concluded that, while the BIA’s insistence on uniformity might be 
the more orderly answer to the section 212(h) interpretive problem, it was 
not the right one.366 
If the Supreme Court takes on the 212(h) issue, it should follow Judge 
Berzon and the majority courts to find the eligibility bar unambiguous:  the 
aggravated felony and continuous residence bars apply only to those LPRs 
who gained their status through consular processing and were admitted at 
the border as LPRs.  Ultimately, the BIA, the Eighth Circuit, and the 
dissenting writers did not provide satisfactory explanations for why the 
statutory phrase was ambiguous or why the results of the majority’s reading 
would be absurd.  Instead, they simply disagreed with Congress’s decision 
to bar only those LPRs who had entered the country in that status.  Despite 
the fact that the distinctions embodied in the statute may seem irrational and 
strange, the Court should stay true to the plain meaning of the text and 
invite Congress to amend the INA if it meant something different. 
B.  The BIA’s Interpretation Is Not Permissible:  
A Call for Lenity 
As argued above, the Court should find that the language of section 
212(h) is not ambiguous.  This section argues that, even if the Court did 
decide the text was ambiguous, it should not accept the BIA’s interpretation 
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of section 212(h) because it is not a permissible construction of the 
statute.367 
As discussed in Part II, there are several arguments the Government and 
the BIA put forth as to why their interpretation is reasonable.  But reading 
section 212(h) to deny all LPRs who have committed an aggravated felony 
or do not meet the continuous residence requirement the chance to apply for 
a waiver is not in fact permissible when one considers the purpose of 
212(h).368 
In considering the spirit of section 212(h) and what it is meant to 
accomplish, it becomes clear that at least one of its goals is leniency toward 
noncitizens that would otherwise be removable.  Section 212(h) provides 
discretionary waivers for certain grounds of inadmissibility to those who 
meet certain conditions.  It forgives the criminal transgressions of those 
who are inadmissible solely for having committed a prostitution offense 
more than fifteen years ago, those who have suffered domestic violence, 
and those whose U.S.-citizen or LPR relatives would experience hardship if 
they were deported.369  By its very nature, section 212(h) thus “contains a 
purpose of leniency and forgiveness.”370 
Furthermore, immigration laws in general have as at least a purpose the 
goal of ensuring family unity.371  Congress recognized family unity as a 
significant consideration in distributing 212(h) waivers, as seen in section 
212(h)(B), which applies to those whose qualifying relatives would suffer 
extreme hardship upon their deportation.  By reading the provision in 
section 212(h) to exclude all LPRs from applying for a waiver even when 
their removal would cause extreme hardship to a qualifying spouse or child, 
more noncitizens would potentially be split from their families, in conflict 
with an overall goal of hardship waivers.372  The spirit of the statute thus 
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supports a narrow reading of the bar to eligibility—one that would allow at 
least certain LPRs to apply—especially those who adjusted status here and 
are more likely to have strong family ties to the United States.373 
With its dual purposes of promoting family unity and forgiveness, section 
212(h) provides the perfect context for applying the immigration rule of 
lenity.  Especially today, when grounds for removal have expanded just as 
avenues for relief have shrunk,374 it is important for the Court to affirm the 
majority courts.  As amendments to the INA have made the removal 
process increasingly mechanical and inhumane,375 a just application of 
section 212(h) supports a more narrow reading of the 212(h) bars to 
eligibility.  The fact that the ability to apply for a 212(h) waiver can have an 
enormous impact on an LPR’s life and family supports a more lenient 
approach.376 
C.  Where Is the Court Going? 
Given the Court’s inconsistent approach to deference to the BIA on 
issues of statutory interpretation, it is hard to say whether the Court will 
embrace this reading of section 212(h).  Johnson believes that, by faithfully 
following Chevron, the Court is moving away from historically 
unquestioning deference to the BIA and instead mainstreaming immigration 
analyses.377  While some of the outcomes of the cases from 2009 to 2013 
suggest as much, it is also possible that most of the issues of statutory 
interpretation that the Court considered in its past few terms were simply 
not very difficult or controversial.  In Martinez Gutierrez, the statute simply 
did not contain an imputation component at all; pursuant to traditional 
administrative law norms, the agency could fill the gap as long as it did so 
reasonably.378  Johnson cites Carachuri-Rosendo and Moncrieffe as 
symbolic of the Court’s sympathy for long-term LPRs and as a movement 
away from deference to the BIA.379  But in Carachuri-Rosendo, the BIA in 
fact agreed with the Court’s final outcome and only ruled differently 
because it felt constrained by federal precedent.380  The Court’s opinion in 
substance therefore did not actually depart from the stance the BIA said it 
would have chosen in cases where it was not so constrained.  Even in 
overturning the BIA, the Court took pains to emphasize that its rejection of 
the government’s broad understanding of the meaning of “aggravated 
felony” would have a very limited impact on “policing our Nation’s 
borders” and that the Attorney General still had discretion in issuing 
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relief.381  So, while Johnson is correct that the Court used unremarkable 
tools of statutory interpretation, Carachuri-Rosendo is not a strong 
indication that the Court is becoming more willing to overturn BIA 
decisions.  It was easy for the Court to overrule the BIA in that case, 
especially because the BIA was interpreting a criminal statute for which the 
BIA itself said it did not deserve deference.382  Similarly, in Moncrieffe, the 
BIA’s holding turned on the interpretation of a criminal statute rather than 
an interpretation of the INA.383  It was fairly uncontroversial for the Court 
to overturn the BIA in both cases.384 
Judulang presents a much stronger case for the argument that the Court 
may be interested in holding the BIA to a higher standard.  Although there 
the Court chose to use the APA to strike down a BIA policy, its decision 
also has implications for a Chevron analysis (indeed, Justice Kagan said the 
analysis would be the same under Chevron as under the APA).385  Judulang 
signaled that the Court might be more searching in reviewing agency 
statutory construction in three ways:  (1) it focused on examining the 
underlying purpose of the laws at issue, (2) it made no reference to the 
plenary power doctrine, and (3) the Court was deeply critical of the BIA.  
Scialabba, however, frustrates each of those “glimmer[s] of hope.”386 
First, in Judulang, the Court emphasized that, when reviewing an agency 
interpretation of its statute, it is important to consider the purpose of the 
laws at issue.387  If the Court considered the fact that section 212(h) is 
meant to generally give relief, such an inquiry could support the majority 
interpretation.388  However, it is not clear that Judulang has ushered in what 
Stein saw as a new hopeful era.389  In Scialabba, the Court did conduct a 
purpose inquiry, finding that the legislative purpose behind the family 
preference system was “that each immigrant must have a qualified and 
willing sponsor” and that the BIA’s interpretation of the specific statute fit 
that purpose.390  In framing the statute’s purpose that way, the Court 
ignored a competing legislative purpose:  the reason behind having 
derivative applications in the first place is to avoid separating families 
despite the fact that not all family members always have a sponsor.391  
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Similarly, if the Court framed the purpose of section 212(h) as limiting 
available waivers rather than providing relief, the purpose-driven inquiry 
could actually hurt LPRs.392 
Second, Judulang suggested indeed that the Court might be more willing 
to reject a strong adherence to historical BIA deference as encompassed in 
the plenary power doctrine.393  However, the Court made a complete 
reversal in Scialabba, reverting back to using plenary power doctrine 
language.394  Lastly, while Justice Kagan was extremely critical of the BIA 
in Judulang,395 her tone changed significantly in Scialabba.396  Scialabba’s 
reversion to plenary power and agency deference is troubling at a time 
when its record in the past decade suggests the BIA is anything but 
“responsible and expert.”397 
CONCLUSION 
The Justices’ discord in Scialabba and varying theories on the current 
state of agency deference show that the verdict is still out on whether the 
Court has closed the door on the plenary power doctrine.  Still, it is true that 
the Court has been using traditional tools of interpretation in its review of 
BIA interpretation cases over the past few years.  What does this all mean 
for section 212(h)? 
The dissent in Stanovsek cited Scialabba for the proposition that 
deference is particularly important in the immigration context, which 
suggests that the dissent saw hope in Scialabba for its position on section 
212(h).398  However, if the Court applies traditional tools of statutory 
interpretation as it has been and applies the definitions from INA sections 
101(a)(13) and 101(a)(20) to the phrase at issue, it will likely conclude that 
the meaning of section 212(h) is clear:  only those LPRs who were admitted 
at a port of entry in LPR status are subject to the bar in 212(h).  While it 
may be unsettling that Congress would distinguish between LPRs based on 
the procedure by which they obtained that status, it is not for any court or 
agency to abandon the plain meaning of the statute.  Congress chose that 
“tortured language” for a reason, and it is up to Congress to change the 
statute if it feels so compelled. 
In the meantime, in an era where immigrants are finding themselves 
increasingly exposed to deportation with fewer avenues for relief, a more 
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lenient reading of section 212(h) is all the more important.  As the courts of 
appeals determine this issue one by one, it remains to be seen whether the 
Court will finally settle the question of which LPRs are barred from seeking 
212(h) waivers. 
